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Many U.S. laws protect privacy by governing recording. Recently, however, 
courts have recognized a First Amendment “right to record.” This Article 
addresses how courts should handle privacy laws in light of the developing 
First Amendment right to record. 
The privacy harms addressed by recording laws are situated harms. 
Recording changes the way people behave in physical spaces by altering the 
nature of those spaces. Thus, recording laws can be placed within a long line 
of First Amendment case law that recognizes a valid government interest in 
managing the qualities of rivalrous physical space, so as not to allow one 
person’s behavior to disrupt the behavior of others. That interest, importantly, 
will not always justify suppressing recording, but it can be distinguished from 
an impermissible government interest in suppressing speech. Moreover, the 
government’s interest in managing the qualities of a particular environment 
can itself be speech-protective—and has been recognized as such. 
As technological development brings more recording devices into the 
physical world, courts will need to determine how to balance speech interests 
and privacy. First Amendment doctrine, often blunt in nature, is in fact, and 
perhaps surprisingly, equipped to address the nuances of this challenge. 
Regulating recording governs a moment of interaction in physical space, not a 
downstream editorial decision that may cause dignitary harms. Regulation, 
thus, does not break with the U.S. free speech tradition of protecting the 
publication and distribution of information. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many laws in the United States protect privacy by governing recording. 
Wiretap and eavesdropping laws, video voyeurism laws, and a host of new 
privacy laws all target the moment at which a recording is made or information 
is gathered. Recent cases, however, have recognized a First Amendment “right 
to record.”1 While commentators have argued for the existence of this First 
 
1 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 
F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming 
of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and 
district courts.”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e 
agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, 
  
2017] PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO RECORD 169 
 
Amendment right, none have analyzed, at any length, its implications for 
privacy laws.2 
Privacy governance has always been in tension with the First Amendment.3 
Usually, however, that tension has played out around the distribution of 
information, not recording or information gathering. Until recently, governing 
recording was, in fact, the simplest way to protect privacy in the United States 
without triggering First Amendment scrutiny. 
Governing the distribution of information interferes with a publisher’s 
editorial choices and often requires assessing a reader’s reaction to speech.4 
 
manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct.”). 
2 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (2014) (arguing that 
recording is First Amendment salient, but electing not to set the level of scrutiny that should 
apply to privacy laws, as “the answer will depend on context”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1079-80 (2015) (arguing that recording, 
as a type of speech production, should be protected, but only when it produces information 
about a matter of public concern); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First 
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 380-81, 
384, 398 (2011) (arguing that recording is protected as an extension of memory, though the 
right might be considered waived in private spaces); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free 
Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997-98 (2016) (arguing 
that the First Amendment protects recording even when it occurs in a privately owned 
space); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): 
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Google 
Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 122 (2012) (discussing how the right to free 
expression should include a right to information gathering, and envisioning exceptions for 
privacy). See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and 
Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015) (discussing the right to record in 
the context of unmanned aerial vehicles). Joel Reidenberg has discussed the right to record 
from the perspective of privacy law, and is largely critical of the developing First 
Amendment framework, believing that any protection should be limited in scope to 
protecting matters of public concern. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 141, 152 (2014). 
3 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 357, 361-65 (2011) [hereinafter Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy] (discussing 
the tension between the disclosure tort and the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People 
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000). But see Margot E. 
Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of 
Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2015) (identifying 
studies that suggest that surveillance produces conformity, which has negative implications 
for First Amendment freedoms); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
387, 393-407 (2008) (arguing that First Amendment values require intellectual privacy 
protection); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2015) [hereinafter Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) 
Constitutional]. 
4 See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999) 
(finding that California could not restrict access to and use of arrestees’ addresses for 
  
170 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:167 
 
The Supreme Court suggested in Bartnicki v. Vopper5 that privacy governance 
should be aimed at recording, not distribution.6 Where telling a publisher or 
speaker to retract lawfully obtained, truthful information implicates the First 
Amendment, under Bartnicki, the government can make it unlawful to obtain 
information in the first instance, without necessarily invoking First 
Amendment scrutiny. The right to record threatens this governance model. The 
moment of recording is no longer a First Amendment-free zone. 
Courts appear conscious of the deregulatory power of a recording right and 
have sought limiting principles. Courts have cabined the scope of the right to 
record based on both content and physical location.7 Courts have also proposed 
treating the right to record as though it were expressive activity in a physical 
space, like a parade.8 This treatment would allow courts to balance privacy 
against speech when evaluating recording, rather than strike down most 
recording laws under strict scrutiny. 
Both current and proposed judicial treatment leads, however, to challenging 
questions. First, why is it that the scope of the right to record might differ in 
different physical spaces, as courts currently suggest? Second, if recording is 
expressive, how does one disentangle a legitimate government interest in 
protecting privacy from an impermissible government interest in restricting 
speech? 
My central claim is that the contours of the protected right to record are 
defined by the privacy harms that the right potentially causes. Understanding 
the right to record is possible only by properly articulating the privacy interests 
 
commercial purposes, where addresses were available in police reports); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (finding unconstitutional the suppression of publication of a rape 
victim’s name when the name was accidentally disclosed in a police report); Cox Broad. 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (finding suppression of publication of a rape 
victim’s name unconstitutional, where the name was publicly available). 
5 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
6 Id. at 526-35 (finding that the government could not prohibit downstream publication 
of an illegal recording, the content of which was a “matter of public concern,” so long as a 
publisher’s hands were clean, but suggesting that the point of recording could still be 
governed in the face of the First Amendment). 
7 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he eavesdropping 
statute restricts a medium of expression—the use of a common instrument of 
communication—and thus an integral step in the speech process. As applied here, it 
interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials 
performing their duties in public.”) (emphasis added); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public 
spaces . . . .”) (emphasis added); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 
2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public 
officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public 
interest.”) (emphases added). 
8 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 110-38 (applying forum doctrine to airspace in framing 
discussion of regulation of drones under the First Amendment). 
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at stake. This claim stands even as the Supreme Court in recent cases has 
repeatedly disavowed balancing speech against other nonspeech harms.9 
To understand the right to record, then, we must understand the privacy 
harm. Privacy can be many things.10 Recording implicates a particular type of 
privacy interest that is entwined with physical space.11 Laws that govern 
recording enable individuals to dynamically manage their social accessibility 
in physical space and over time.12 In order to manage their social accessibility, 
people rely on a variety of tactics and circumstances, including: physical walls; 
clothing; others’ forgetfulness over time; and physical distance. When the use 
of a technology disrupts any of these tactics and circumstances, the 
government may have an interest in intervening to prevent undesirable changes 
in behavior, including chilling effects on speech. 
Understanding privacy as involving both physical and temporal features of 
an individual’s environment helps answer the two most difficult questions 
about the right to record. First, the scope of the right to record is treated 
differently in different physical spaces because the strength of the privacy 
interest varies in different physical locations. Courts consequently set doctrinal 
defaults that favor privacy in private locations and speech in public locations 
(not that private and public are perfectly distinct, but that is the shorthand used 
in the doctrine here). Second, a government interest in protecting privacy can 
be unrelated to the suppression of speech, if it goes to enabling the successful 
management of social accessibility in a physical location, rather than 
disfavoring particular types of content or speakers.13 This means that even in 
 
9 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). 
10 Daniel Solove has created a complex taxonomy outlining different kinds of privacy. 
See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
11 See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
1113, 1132-35 (2015) (building on the work of social psychologist Irwin Altman in defining 
privacy in physical spaces). See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR (1975) (discussing human privacy, crowding, territory, and personal space). 
12 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (“Our 
interest in privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to 
which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the 
extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.”). 
13 In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court set out a test which 
requires that government regulation (1) be “within the constitutional power of 
[g]overnment”; (2) “further[] an important or substantial governmental interest” that is 
unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) incidentally restrict speech no more than is 
necessary to further that interest. Id. at 377; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
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public spaces, where the right to record will be more protected, the government 
can sometimes articulate an interest in privacy that can withstand analysis 
under the intermediate scrutiny usually applied to expressive acts entwined 
with physical presence. 
The right to record exemplifies a larger concern about current First 
Amendment doctrine: As coverage expands, and the doctrine ossifies, First 
Amendment protection can serve as a deregulatory tool.14 Alternatively, as 
coverage expands, courts might fundamentally alter First Amendment doctrine, 
reducing speech protection.15 At first glance, the right to record looks like it 
may trigger this looming conflict. As this Article demonstrates, however, 
closer inspection of the right to record in fact illuminates existing nuance 
within current First Amendment doctrine. It shows that the crisis of First 
Amendment expansionism is not always as stark as it may initially appear. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the implications of the 
right to record for the future of First Amendment law. Part II discusses whether 
recording is speech. Part III characterizes the privacy harm from recording to 
explain why recording is properly viewed as a regulable speech-act. Finally, 
Part IV explains the interface between privacy and the right to record, 
providing examples. 
I. THE EXPANDING FIRST AMENDMENT 
First Amendment protection has recently been depicted as ever-expanding 
and increasingly blunt. Multiple scholars characterize recent First Amendment 
doctrine as extending speech protection into new subject-matter areas, with 
litigators taking advantage of the strength of First Amendment protections by 
rebranding ordinary economic activity as speech.16 Scholars also worry that the 
Supreme Court has ossified First Amendment analysis so that courts use the 
doctrine as a hammer, failing to take context into account.17 The result, 
according to a number of recent critics, is that the First Amendment has 
become a blunt tool of deregulation.18 We should, according to these critics, 
 
14 See infra Part I. 
15 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1613, 1635 (2015) (discussing how expanding First Amendment coverage 
could potentially weaken “existing doctrinal tools”). 
16 See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 
1200 (2015); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: 
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 178 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 
2002); Schauer, supra note 15, at 1635. 
17 See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 367 (2014) (“A 
better understanding of free speech practice requires thinking that is factored, not formulaic; 
contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not absolutist; plural, not 
singular.”). 
18 E.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384 (“Business interests and other conservative 
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worry about the consequences of expanding First Amendment coverage 
because, inevitably, commercial entities will use “speech” protection to escape 
a stronger government hand. 
These concerns are not entirely misplaced. The Supreme Court in recent 
cases appears to have fixed the possible exceptions to First Amendment 
protection into a short, historical list.19 The Court has several times now 
refused to weigh broader social interests with speech interests to create new 
exceptions to First Amendment protection once it has established that a 
particular activity is covered by the First Amendment.20 When First 
Amendment coverage extends to a particular activity, the fear is that courts 
will apply strict scrutiny, which is famously “fatal in fact,” or some other form 
of heightened speech scrutiny under which the regulations are doomed to fail.21 
This overly blunt approach may derail all kinds of regulatory efforts, from 
protection of data privacy to bans on the off-label promotion of drugs.22 
Some scholars fear this approach to the First Amendment will lead 
inevitably to deregulation. Others, however, see a related problem looming. 
They fear that First Amendment expansionism—courts finding speech in more 
and more places—will result not in deregulation but in a judicial backlash.23 In 
other words, arguing that everything is speech and is thus protected by the First 
 
groups are finding that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and 
more easily be rephrased in the language of the first amendment . . . .”); Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 286 
(2000) (warning that Lochnerism could be revived through First Amendment analysis); 
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 134 (“Commercial interests are 
increasingly laying claim, often successfully, to First Amendment protections.”). 
19 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the following as 
historically unprotected speech: incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to 
criminal conduct, “fighting-words,” child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech 
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”); 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (listing obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct as historically unprotected speech). 
20 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546-47 (refusing to create an exception for lies); Stevens, 
559 U.S. at 470 (refusing to create an exception for crush videos). 
21 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (discussing strict 
scrutiny in the context of the Equal Protection Clause); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Dark Side of 
the First Amendment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1480, 1485 (2014) (noting that the “Court has 
retreated in some recent decisions to an indefensible form of absolutism”). But see Richards, 
Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, supra note 3, at 1505 (arguing that data 
privacy law generally does not raise First Amendment issues). 
22 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); United States v. Caronia, 
703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a conviction for promoting an FDA-
approved drug for off-label use violated the First Amendment under heightened scrutiny). 
23 See AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI 
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 4 (2015) (predicting a backlash in First Amendment doctrine). 
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Amendment will not result in everything being protected; it will result in a 
lowering of protection for speech in general.24 Courts will back away from 
categorical reasoning and employ balancing tests instead, erasing decades of 
doctrinal development that has proven extraordinarily protective for speakers 
in the United States.25 In fact, several scholars call explicitly for this approach: 
harmonize U.S. free speech law with the law of the rest of the world, balancing 
speech against other societal values.26 As a general move, this would represent 
an extraordinary change in First Amendment doctrine, erasing years of 
doctrinal calibration to protect dissident and unpopular speech.27 
Current discussions of the right to record appear at first to fall squarely 
within this narrative. First Amendment scholars largely argue for expanding 
First Amendment protection to cover a right to record,28 while privacy scholars 
fear that the right will become primarily a deregulatory tool.29 These fears are 
not misplaced; companies have already used the right to record to argue for 
deregulation of automatic license plate readers (“ALPRs”) and drones.30 
Several scholars, thus, call for limiting First Amendment protection of the 
recording right in various ways.31 Others fear, however, that limits on First 
 
24 See Schauer, supra note 15, at 1635-36. 
25 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791-93 (2011) (applying 
United States v. Stevens and firmly rejecting a balancing test, holding instead that the 
categorical approach is better). 
26 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 1497-98 (claiming that except for protection of 
dissenting speech, the United States largely gets speech protection wrong while Europe gets 
it right); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016) (proposing a 
balancing test for free speech cases that are “difficult . . . involving competing rights”). 
27 Margot E. Kaminski, The First Amendment’s Public Relations Problem: A Response 
to Alexander Tsesis’s Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 
103, 106. 
28 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 380-81, 384, 398; 
Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 997-98. 
29 See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 153. 
30 Dig. Recognition Network Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 954-55 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(addressing a lawsuit by manufacturers arguing that the law banning ALPRs violated their 
First Amendment rights); Brief of News Media Amici in Support of Respondent Raphael 
Pirker at 7-12, Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730 (Nov. 18, 2014) (No. CP-217) 
(arguing that an absolute ban on unmanned aerial systems would violate the First 
Amendment by interfereing with newsgatherers’ rights). 
31 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065; Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 155; see also 
Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2016) 
(advocating an antitargeting approach, which would protect phone cameras and like media, 
because “[c]ameras and other audiovisual recording devices are conventional means of 
communication—that is, they are conventionally used for communicative purposes” but 
would not protect other kinds of recording technologies). 
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Amendment coverage will enable the government to target information 
gathering as a way of preventing speech.32 
There is a third way, which does not result in either privacy deregulation or 
undercoverage. While the dominant narrative paints the picture of a blunt, 
categorical First Amendment, dozens of doctrinal twists regularly allow for the 
balancing of speech against other interests.33 Courts assess a wide variety of 
First Amendment issues under analyses more closely resembling balancing 
tests: time, place, and manner regulations; regulations of symbolic conduct; 
regulations of speech by government employees; and much more.34 Even the 
distribution of private information may, under Bartnicki, trigger some kind of 
balancing test.35 Appellate courts similarly appear prepared to approach the 
right to record under some sort of balancing test. 
The key question is how to justify this intuition. Why is recording the kind 
of thing better approached under a balancing test? Those scholars proposing a 
balancing test in this context have not offered an answer, apart from pointing 
out that categorically protecting recording will result in privacy deregulation. 
We cannot create a categorical right to record, the argument goes, or privacy 
will be unprotectable. Other scholars argue that the recording right should be 
limited in scope to only matters of public concern, grounding the right in 
protection of democratic self-governance.36 This second approach is a sort of 
categorical form of balancing: it locks in a particular balance of privacy and 
speech by restricting the scope of coverage. But this approach has been 
subjected to valid criticism for rejecting or ignoring other theories for why we 
protect freedom of speech. 
Recording in fact critically resembles the kinds of expression, expressive 
acts, or penumbral rights ordinarily subjected to First Amendment balancing 
tests rather than categorical analysis. However, we can see that recording is 
more akin to expressive acts like parades than disembodied words on the 
printed page only if we understand the nature of the government interest. And 
the government can regulate to protect privacy only if we can distinguish that 
interest in privacy protection from impermissible interests in regulating the 
content of speech.37 
In the language of First Amendment scholarship, we often treat First 
Amendment protection as involving two steps. First, we analyze whether a 
particular act is “covered” by the First Amendment—whether it is salient to the 
First Amendment because it is recognizable as expressive or entwined with 
 
32 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61; Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51. 
33 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 819-20. 
34 Id. at 810-21. 
35 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
36 E.g., Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1035. 
37 This Article offers the “careful examination of relevant . . . regulatory interests” called 
for by Bhagwat in an intermediate scrutiny context. Bhagwat, supra note 33, at 826. 
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expression.38 Second, we ask what kind of scrutiny applies to determine 
whether the expressive act is protected and the regulation fails.39 
The right to record suggests several things. First, it suggests that 
assessments of the type of harm at issue are implicit in both coverage and 
scrutiny analyses. In other words, despite the Supreme Court’s recent 
disavowals of harm assessments and balancing, the scope of a speech right is at 
least partially defined by a court’s conception of its related harms. Second, the 
right to record suggests that there are physical places where speech disappears: 
what is expressive in one location may not be expressive for First Amendment 
purposes in other locations.40 Thus, taking the approach that recording is 
universally “covered” by the First Amendment, without seriously assessing 
scrutiny, ignores that the right functionally does not exist in some places. 
Understanding the right to record contributes to discussions of “invisible 
speech”—clearly expressive activities, like agreeing to a contract, or joining a 
conspiracy, or committing a securities violation, that are not visible to the First 
Amendment at all.41 
Privacy may end up breaking, or at least bending, the First Amendment, 
requiring recalibration of the current ossified categorical approach in other 
areas. We may need to assess, for example, whether courts should generally in 
the privacy context break with traditions of content neutrality to take into 
account whether information is about a private matter or a matter of public 
concern, as suggested by the Court in Bartnicki and other cases. We may need 
to consider whether First Amendment doctrine, currently suspicious of 
regulation of distribution, should be altered to allow an exception for revenge 
pornography, or some form of a “right to be forgotten,” or other forms of data 
privacy governance that target information sharing.42 
But with respect to the recording right, the contribution of this Article is that 
the doctrine is already nuanced enough to accommodate a privacy-speech 
interface of a particular kind. Buried in existing First Amendment doctrine is a 
nuanced understanding of exactly the kind of privacy protected by laws 
governing private actors and their ability to record. 
 
38 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766-68 (2004). 
39 See id. at 1769-71 (discussing the difference between First Amendment protection and 
coverage). 
40 See id. at 1768 (listing several categories of speech, including speech governed by the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Uniform Commercial Code, where the line between First 
Amendment coverage and noncoverage is “invisible”). 
41 Schauer, supra note 38, at 1768. 
42 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 348-49 (2014); Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View 
from the Front Lines, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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II. RECORDING AS SPEECH 
Recording should be protected under the First Amendment. Doctrine, 
theory, and practical considerations all support protecting a right to record. 
None of these explain, however, exactly how or to what extent recording 
should be protected, or how it should be balanced against privacy interests.43 
In this Part, I discuss how recording has been treated with respect to First 
Amendment salience. I then join a growing chorus of voices that advocates for 
a right to record. I compare different ways in which the recording right might 
be salient to the First Amendment: as speech, as an access or newsgathering 
right, or as speech entwined with action. 
In practice, courts have largely chosen to protect the right to record as some 
combination of an access right and speech entwined with action. This leads to 
the question addressed in Part III: How can we arrive at a principled 
understanding of why recording is treated by the First Amendment as situated 
in physical space? The answer lies in understanding the privacy harms that 
recording can trigger. 
A. Recording as Nonspeech 
 Regulating recording was not treated as a First Amendment issue until 
relatively recently. Recording, in other words, has not always been salient as 
expression, and courts continue to divide on whether it receives First 
Amendment protection at all. 
 Some courts in right-to-record cases have asked whether recording is speech 
or conduct. The First Amendment test for distinguishing speech from conduct, 
articulated in Spence v. Washington,44 asks whether somebody intends to 
communicate a particularized message that is likely to be understood.45 
According to several courts applying the Spence test to recording, if there is no 
demonstrable intent to communicate a particularized message to an audience, 
recording is not speech.46 Some courts thus recognize First Amendment 
protection for recording only if a person can show an intent to distribute a 
recording; they otherwise characterize the moment of recording as governable 
action rather than speech.47 A district court recently explained that the First 
 
43 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 109 (arguing for recognition of the right to record, but not 
establishing the appropriate level of scrutiny, explaining that “the contours of First 
Amendment scrutiny are complex and deserve careful consideration”). 
44 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
45 Id. at 410-11; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
46 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 76 (citing cases that reason this way); Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1486 (2013) (suggesting that 
while an actual audience is not necessary, an anticipated audience is). But see Kreimer, 
supra note 2, at 377 (“It is simply not the case, moreover, that an external audience is or 
should be a necessary condition of First Amendment protection.”). 
47 See Baumbauer, supra note 2, at 76-77 (citing cases that require an intent to 
communicate for photography to be deemed speech); Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1479 
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Amendment would protect recording only if it was accompanied by a verbal 
announcement (or other expressive conduct) explicitly indicating disagreement 
with police activity.48 As discussed below, against the backdrop of both First 
Amendment theory and protection for newsgathering and penumbral rights, 
this reasoning is significantly flawed. 
Another way to approach recording is by looking at the type of law at issue 
rather than the nature of the governed act. The First Amendment does not 
protect newsgatherers from laws of general applicability.49 A newspaper and 
its reporters may be subject to general tax laws, to antitrust laws, and even to 
requirements that reporters, like all citizens, respond to a grand jury 
subpoena.50 A law can, however, move out of the category of a law of general 
applicability if it impermissibly targets a particular speaker or subject matter.51 
Privacy laws governing recording have historically been characterized as 
laws of general applicability, not as laws targeted at speech or particular 
speakers. Most wiretap laws, eavesdropping laws, and other privacy laws tend 
to be subject-matter—or at least viewpoint—neutral, and thus were, until 
recently, invisible to the First Amendment. For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in 1971 compared eavesdropping laws to trespass and 
theft laws, which are considered generally applicable forms of governance not 
 
(explaining that algorithmic speech should be protected under the First Amendment only 
when a human is “sending a substantive message in such a way that others can receive it”); 
see also Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
48 Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 535. I led a recent amicus effort urging the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit to overturn this decision. Law Professors Amicus in Fields (Right to 
Record) MARGOTKAMINSKI.COM (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.margotkaminski.com/?p=73 
[https://perma.cc/6WA9-GF94]. 
49 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”). 
50 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding that subpoenaing the press 
does not violate the First Amendment); Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 
139-40 (1969) (applying First Amendment doctrine concerning newsgathering to antitrust 
laws); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6-7, 19-20 (1945) (same); Associated 
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937) (holding an NLRB order under the National 
Labor Relations Act applicable to the Associated Press constitutional under the First 
Amendment). 
51 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 
(1983) (finding a tax targeting a newspaper to be unconstitutional, but noting “[i]t is beyond 
dispute that the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally 
applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems”); Grosjean v. 
Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (same); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
U.S. 552, 565 (2011) (finding that content-based regulation will receive strict scrutiny when 
it is aimed at a particular speaker); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381, 391-92 
(1992) (finding that the government cannot target a particular speaker or viewpoint within a 
category of speech that is otherwise unprotected). 
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subject to First Amendment scrutiny.52 Other courts have similarly treated 
privacy laws as laws of general applicability.53 The Supreme Court appeared to 
condone this approach in Bartnicki.54 According to these courts, laws targeting 
the distribution of recordings target speech, but laws governing recording do 
not. 
Even before current right-to-record case law, this approach of treating 
recording laws as laws of general applicability began to break down. In 1995, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that while journalists were 
not immune from liability for breaking generally applicable laws such as 
trespass, privacy laws were distinct from trespass law.55 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit revisited the issue in 1997, when it assessed privacy laws with greater 
deference to newsgatherers, suggesting that the privacy laws were no longer 
inscrutable laws of general applicability.56 
The fact that recording laws are now at least partially visible to First 
Amendment analysis suggests that they are moving out of the box of laws that 
includes trespass and into the box that includes laws that target speech.57 
Scholars advocating for a right to record push for precisely this shift: to 
treating privacy laws that constrain recording as speech-targeting laws, not 
laws of general applicability.58 
B. Protecting the Right to Record: First Amendment Theory 
Bartnicki appears to set up a workable framework for privacy regulation: 
target recording, not distribution. On closer scrutiny, however, its suggestion 
 
52 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First Amendment is 
not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means . . . .”). 
53 See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(analyzing privacy implications when a news team entered someone’s bedroom without 
authorization to film a rescue attempt by paramedics); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 
Cal. Rptr. 269, 272-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that plaintiff had a cause of action 
against a private investigator who obtained entrance into a hospital room by deception); 
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting First 
Amendment newsgathering defense regarding the violation of eavesdropping statutes), rev’d 
on other grounds, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1999). 
54 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-31 (2001). 
55 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that 
“there is no journalists’ privilege to trespass,” but noting that the reporters “entered offices 
that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped 
physicians engaged in professional, not personal, communications with strangers (the testers 
themselves)”). 
56 Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997). 
57 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 602 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Illinois 
eavesdropping statute may or may not be a law of general applicability . . . .”). 
58 E.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 111; Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51; Kreimer, 
supra note 2, at 392. 
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that recording should be a First Amendment-free zone does not hold up.59 I 
join a number of scholars in arguing that theory, intuition, and doctrine all 
suggest that the right to record should be afforded at least some form of First 
Amendment protection.60 
First Amendment protection is justified under three dominant theories: (1) 
protection for the marketplace of ideas; (2) protection of speech necessary for 
democratic self-governance; and (3) protection of the individual autonomy 
interest in speech.61 Under the theory of the marketplace of ideas, we protect 
speech so that a listener or reader can shop amongst competing ideas in a 
search for “truth.” Under the theory of democratic self-governance, we protect 
speech to better enable citizens to participate in the process of governance. 
Under the autonomy theory, we protect an individual’s autonomy, allowing the 
government to regulate her speech only when a significant, nonspeech-related 
harm can be shown. 
Under any of these theories, some version of the right to record should be 
protected.62 Audiovisual recordings often contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas and are now a regular part of the vast array of media consumed by most 
individuals in their searches for “truth.” Even other kinds of recording, such as 
gathering data to build maps of the physical environment,63 or recording the 
 
59 Here I agree with Jane Bambauer, who pushes back on the Bartnicki framework and 
calls for a First Amendment “right to create knowledge” as a necessary precursor to speech. 
Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61 (observing of Bartnicki that “[i]f the dissemination of 
mechanical recordings receives First Amendment protection (which it does), then the 
creation of those same recordings must have First Amendment significance, too” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
60 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999. 
61 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 
(2011); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 75 (1948) (noting the importance of the value of democratic self-governance 
by concluding that “we of the United States have decided to be a self-governing 
community”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141 (1859) (emphasizing the importance of 
autonomy interests by noting that the “acts of an individual may be hurtful to others . . . 
without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights”); Martin H. Redish, 
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). 
62 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 91-104; Blitz, supra note 2, at 174 (“[I]f and when the 
First Amendment protects such activity, it should do so with a right to receive information 
and ideas that protects the pursuit of these individual interests. Such an emphasis is not only 
necessary to advance central First Amendment purposes, but compatible both with limits on 
the scope of the right, and with the goal of leaving room for privacy rights that entail 
denying individuals some of the information they might seek.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 
379 (“The government is barred from intermeddling in both speech and thought because 
both undergird the constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular 
sovereignty.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999 (“First Amendment theory strongly 
supports the notion that video recording is a form of expression or conduct preparatory to 
speech.”). 
63 Blitz, supra note 2, at 124-26. 
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heat emanations from apartments to determine whether they are occupied by 
more than the permitted number of tenants,64 contribute more information to 
the marketplace of ideas. 
Under the theory of democratic self-governance, we should at least protect 
the right of citizens to record government officials or acts of governance, in 
order to better enable individuals to participate in the political process.65 This 
theory suggests, for example, that recording police activity should be squarely 
protected by the First Amendment, both because the recording serves a 
government oversight function and because it can inform future policy 
choices.66 A broader view of democratic self-governance suggests protecting 
not just political audiovisual recordings, but anything that properly belongs in 
the public sphere, where it can contribute to an individual’s understanding of 
herself as a citizen. Similarly, a broader view of democratic self-governance 
suggests that the First Amendment should protect anything that, when 
regulated, threatens an individual’s view of the legitimacy of her 
government.67 If government regulation of, say, cellular phone recording 
threatens an individual’s sense of the legitimacy of her government, it should 
be protected. 
Both the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance theories 
suggest a hierarchy of protected recordings, however. We might, for example, 
under self-governance theory, protect only recordings of public figures or 
matters of public concern68 and afford less protection to other kinds of subject 
matter. Under the marketplace of ideas, we may be less concerned with 
frivolous recordings or seemingly personal recordings because their 
contribution to a search for “truth” may be characterized as less significant. 
Under autonomy theory, however, these hierarchies disintegrate. One can 
argue under autonomy theory that all forms of recording should be protected 
unless the government can show a significant nonspeech-related harm.69 Those 
 
64 A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning 
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1724. 
65 See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065 (noting that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
multiple cases that First Amendment protections are extended to speech “about a matter of 
public concern”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999-1004 (explaining how the advent 
of modern video recording technology and distribution has better enabled individuals to 
participate in democracy); Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 154 (discussing the value of image 
capture for providing greater transparency in the job performance of public officials). 
66 See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record 
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2016) [hereinafter Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras]; 
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 413 [hereinafter Simonson, 
Copwatching] (2016). 
67 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2369 (2000). 
68 Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065; Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 155-56. 
69 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 100; Blitz, supra note 2, at 174 (discussing the broad 
protection the First Amendment should provide to an individual’s right to receive 
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who agree with the autonomy theory of the First Amendment will find it 
hardest to stomach a right to record that is limited solely to matters of public 
concern.  
There is evidence in current doctrine that courts find the autonomy theory 
significant. Speech protections generally run broader than just protecting “high 
value” speech, and there are significant practical problems—resulting in both 
overinclusion and underinclusion—with asking courts to assess when speech is 
“high value,” or a matter of public concern.70 Moreover, the current Supreme 
Court appears largely to embrace a broader First Amendment, affording 
protection to clearly lower-value speech—such as lies or violent video 
games—not just speech valuable to self-governance or a high-minded search 
for “truth.”71 
Yet, it is possible to embrace the autonomy theory of the First Amendment 
while also recognizing significant autonomy interests in privacy protection.72 
The right-to-record puzzle is most interesting and difficult under this theory 
that encourages the broadest form of First Amendment protection. How should 
we protect individual autonomy with the right to record while also protecting 
individual autonomy from ubiquitous or mass surveillance?73 
First Amendment theory, therefore, suggests that at least some recording 
should be protected by the First Amendment.74 It does not, however, dictate (1) 
what kinds of recordings should be covered by the First Amendment; (2) what 
form of scrutiny laws governing recording should face; or (3) how to reconcile 
competing interests, such as privacy, with an expansive right to record.75 
C. A Note on Automation 
One potential way to limit the scope of the right to record, which might at 
least cabin the number of recordings falling under First Amendment protection, 
would be to recognize a right to record only when there is a human author.76 A 
 
information and ideas when pursuing their individual interests). 
70 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 117 (finding that there is no clear guidance for courts 
to determine which types of speech are important enough to be protected); Blitz, supra note 
2, at 169. 
71 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
72 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 101; Blitz, supra note 2, at 190 (acknowledging that there 
are legitimate concerns about protecting individual privacy when permitting the right to 
record and capture images in public and private places). 
73 Blitz, supra note 2, at 192. 
74 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105. 
75 Id.; Blitz, supra note 2, at 192-93 (stating that government restrictions on information 
gathering must overcome the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test, without analyzing how 
such a balancing test would apply). 
76 Cf. Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 100 (suggesting limiting the right to record from drone 
surveillance to journalist authors). 
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large number of recordings are made by cameras or other sensors placed in 
physical locations, with no human being present to turn the cameras on and off. 
And a large amount of future recordings will likely be made by automatic or 
autonomous systems such as drones or driverless cars, which will use such 
recordings for navigation and other more nefarious purposes, like assessing 
insurance risk.77 One could limit the scope of the conflict between privacy and 
the right to record by eliminating these types of recordings from First 
Amendment coverage.78 
First, this will be hard to do in practice. While determining the nature of 
algorithmic authorship is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting 
that it can be incredibly challenging to draw the line between human and 
algorithmic authorship.79 Second, it is not clear from current case law that such 
a distinction would be viable. Courts assessing recording have not 
distinguished between cameras held by humans and cameras left in place by an 
absent human author.80 
The bigger issue with trying to line-draw around algorithmic authorship, 
however, is that the social meaning of a particular recording will likely be the 
same regardless of whether it is made by a human or an algorithm.81 One 
person’s security tape is another person’s news story.82 It does not matter, from 
a viewer’s perspective, whether the tape is “authored” by a stationary, 
nonhuman security camera, or a lauded film director.83 
 
77 See The First 1000 Commercial UAS Exemptions, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED AERIAL 
VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, www.auvsi.org/1000report [https://perma.cc/33TL-9F8Y] (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2016). 
78 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 132-34 (distinguishing between human photography 
and automated image capture and suggesting that the former might receive greater First 
Amendment protection). 
79 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1493 n.143; Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1495, 1504 (2013); see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free 
Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187 (2016). But see 
James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—And It’s a 
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 408 (2016) (arguing that human and 
algorithmic authorship are the same). 
80 See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 
2007), mentioned in Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1028-29. 
81 See, e.g., Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 720 (2000); Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 73, 77 (2012). 
82 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 347 (“As image-capture capability has diffused, publicly 
salient images emerge not only from premeditated efforts to prepare for public dialogue, but 
from recordings by serendipitous amateur photographers.”); see also Bambauer, supra note 
2, at 85 (“Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question whether 
mechanical recordings are protected speech, it has recognized that information gathering is a 
necessity for speech.”). 
83 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 59-60 (“A distinction can be made between statements 
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This is because the First Amendment protects the rights of listeners in 
addition to the rights of speakers.84 If we recognize that an algorithmically 
“authored” recording can nonetheless impact viewers and listeners as much as 
a human-authored recording, then all three First Amendment theories—the 
marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance, and even autonomy—
suggest extending some form of First Amendment protection to the 
recording.85 
D. Free Speech Intuitions and the Right to Record 
Cultural intuitions about free speech protection similarly suggest that 
recording should be protected by the First Amendment. Take the following 
examples. 
The cases that have given rise to the recognition of the right to record 
largely involve the arrest of citizens who recorded police actions in public 
places.86 If there is no First Amendment protection at all for recording, then a 
person who pulls out a smartphone to record police malfeasance could be 
arrested without judicial scrutiny of the impact on free expression. This would 
also leave legislatures unchecked when enacting laws banning recording. That 
seems wrong. 
A second common fact pattern might trigger more complicated intuitions. A 
number of states have enacted “ag-gag” laws largely aimed at public interest 
groups intent on filming abusive behavior on factory farms.87 On the one hand, 
the banned recording in the ag-gag context takes place on private land, without 
the permission of a private landowner. On the other, the laws target 
newsworthy information and often target particular viewpoints of individuals 
who want to speak out against factory farms. If recording is invisible to the 
First Amendment, then these laws would not undergo judicial scrutiny of their 
impact on free speech, leaving legislatures unchecked. 
Discussion of drones may spark similarly mixed intuitions. On the one hand, 
states have enacted privacy laws governing the use of drones to record private 
 
of fact that are observed and written by a human and those that are collected mechanically, 
and it might be tempting to draw the First Amendment line between the two. But the 
distinction is untenable.”). 
84 See Massaro & Norton, supra note 79, at 1175-78 (emphasizing listener rights as the 
source of protection for artificial intelligence authorship or speech). But cf. Benjamin, supra 
note 46, at 1477 (stating that the rights of listeners and viewers are “articulated as [] 
addition[s] to the rights of speakers, as opposed to [] substitute[s] for them”). 
85 See Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1477-78. 
86 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 
655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
87 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 994-96 (discussing the enactment of legislation in 
various states that “criminalizes the act of nonconsensual audio or video recording on the 
premises of slaughterhouses, factory farms, and other industrial meat operations”). 
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individuals in their own backyards, largely protecting an understandable 
privacy interest.88 On the other, when the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) proclaimed the area immediately above Ferguson, Missouri to be a 
no-fly zone in the wake of public protests, the ban clearly had First 
Amendment implications.89 The restriction on flight above Ferguson prevented 
recording and media reporting of what was happening on the ground. That 
flight ban may have turned out to be justified for safety reasons, but if there is 
no protection for a right to record, then the FAA’s actions would receive no 
First Amendment analysis to determine if an impermissible motive existed for 
regulating speech. 
E. First Amendment Doctrine and the Right to Record 
A right to record fits not only within free speech intuitions and First 
Amendment theory but also within several lines of well-established doctrine. 
Recording might be protected as speech itself, or it might be protected because 
it is a necessary part of a recognized communications medium. The First 
Amendment also protects the corollary or penumbral rights that are necessary 
for speech; newsgathering is a particular kind of corollary right. Again, as with 
First Amendment theory, these doctrines lead to potentially different levels of 
both coverage and scrutiny. The doctrines vary in both the scope and strength 
of potential protection for a right to record. 
Several scholars have suggested that recording video might be fully 
protected expression. They argue that just as writing words or editing a film is 
clearly expressive, recording that film must be expressive, too.90 After all, the 
First Amendment protects movies as speech,91 without asking whether a 
“particularized message” has been expressed.92 The First Amendment protects 
 
88 See, e.g., infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing various states’ drone 
regulations). 
89 See Margot E. Kaminski, Up in the Air: The Free-Speech Problems Raised by 
Regulating Drones, SLATE (Nov. 25 2014, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/faa_s_attempts_to_regulate_
drones_could_have_first_amendment_problems.html [https://perma.cc/X8FZ-669A]; see 
also Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Issues Temporary Flight Restriction over 
Ferguson, Missouri, (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=17854&cid=TW283 
[https://perma.cc/P6WL-E88W]. 
90 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 343; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1015 (“[A]ll 
speech is conduct—whether it involves writing words on a page, carrying a picket sign, [or] 
shouting a protest chant . . . .”). 
91 See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (finding that both “pictures 
[and] films . . . have First Amendment protection”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 495 (1952) (protecting films regardless of commercial motive). 
92 Kreimer, supra note 2, at 373 (“[T]he Court has treated images as media of 
communication without inquiring into an illusively specific message.”). 
  
186 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:167 
 
not just the public exhibition of video but also private viewings.93 If the First 
Amendment protects the distribution and viewing of video, it seems strange to 
say it affords no protection to video recording.94 Additionally, audiovisual 
recording may be fully protected as speech in connection to freedom of 
thought; making a video for later recollection might be analogous to keeping a 
private diary for later personal consumption.95 
 Even if recording is not equivalent to pure speech, there is clear doctrinal 
protection for conduct essential to recognized communications media.96 
Audiovisual recording may be protected as conduct integral to expression, 
even if recording itself is not considered to be equivalent to oral speech or 
writing. Once society recognizes a particular communications medium, First 
Amendment protection extends beyond the finished communications product 
into the production process.97 When the state targets an integral aspect of a 
recognized communications medium, such as by placing a tax on pen and 
paper, that action may be suspect under the First Amendment.98 The Supreme 
Court recognized in 1952 that “motion pictures are a significant medium for 
the communication of ideas.”99 Like buying pen and paper, video recording 
 
93 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means 
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man . . . what books he may read or 
what films he may watch.”). 
94 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61. 
95 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the 
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is 
the beginning of thought.”); Blitz, supra note 2, at 148 (“Taking a picture is in many 
respects analogous to drawing or painting what one sees. It represents and fixes a visual 
experience in a particular medium of expression, usually to remember it later or to share it 
with others.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 342 (commenting that “camera-phone users 
ubiquitously capture and archive images to record their experiences for future reference”); 
id. at 378 (recognizing that “[a] diary entry begins a process of communicating with an 
audience of one: my entries are subject to review by my future self”). 
96 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1018. 
97 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012) (“This observation 
holds true when the expressive medium is mechanical rather than manual.”); Anderson v. 
City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The process of expression 
through a medium has never been thought so distinct from the expression itself that we 
could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and canvas, or that we could value Beethoven 
without the benefit of strings and woodwinds.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 382 (“Almost all 
media of expression can be broken down into a series of social practices and preconditions 
that are not themselves expressive.”); Post, supra note 81, at 717 (“If the state were to 
prohibit the use of [film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage would 
undoubtedly be triggered. This is not because projectors constitute speech acts, but because 
they are integral to the forms of interaction that comprise the genre of the cinema.”). 
98 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 
(1983) (invalidating a tax on ink and paper used in producing newspapers). 
99 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (emphasis added); see also 
Blitz, supra note 2, at 139 (“[T]elling stories with photographically captured light has 
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may be protected because it is conduct that is essentially preparatory to speech 
via a recognized communications medium.100 
This analysis of recording as pure speech or as conduct integral to a 
communications medium leaves open several questions. First, there is the 
question of whether one must always have an audience in mind or an intent to 
distribute the final communications product.101 In order for recording to 
constitute speech, must it be directed to another person? Some scholars have 
argued that it must.102 Others disagree.103 Cases suggest, however, that speech 
need not be published to be protected, pointing to the idea that a distribution 
requirement is not necessary.104  
Second, while these analyses may work for audiovisual film, which the 
Supreme Court has recognized as protected expression and a protected 
medium,105 it is unclear whether they might apply to other kinds of recording. 
This presents a line-drawing problem: Is there some way to distinguish 
between audiovisual recording and, say, observing and recording thermal 
imagery?106 If such distinctions exist, are they principled? Are they workable 
in light of rapid technological change? It can be challenging to determine when 
a particular practice constitutes a recognizable communications medium. This 
 
become, as Kreimer and other scholars observe, a familiar mode of expressing 
oneself . . . .”); Campbell, supra note 31, at 50 (“Cameras and other audiovisual recording 
devices are conventional means of communication—that is, they are conventionally used for 
communicative purposes.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 339 (“In today’s world, personal 
image capture is part of a medium of expression entitled to First Amendment cognizance.”). 
100 See Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51 (“Targeted regulations of audiovisual 
recording thus single out conduct commonly associated with expression and impose an 
apparent disproportionate burden on speech.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1018. 
101 See, e.g., Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding 
that expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment exists where there is an “intent to 
convey a particularized message”). 
102 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1483; Barry P. McDonald, The First 
Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather 
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 257 (2004). 
103 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 59; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 377. 
104 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (explaining 
that the First Amendment protects “a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which 
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect” (quoting Estate 
of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968))). But see Benjamin, 
supra note 46, at 1484 (arguing that meaning has to be communicated to be considered 
protected speech). 
105 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[W]e conclude that 
expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press 
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
106 Campbell, supra note 31, at 52 (suggesting we distinguish between audiovisual 
recording, which should be protected as part of a communications medium, and other kinds 
of recording, which should not be protected). 
  
188 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:167 
 
could result in too little protection, by failing to capture newer technologies, or 
it might not limit protection at all. For example, one could argue that Google 
Maps is now a widespread communications medium, and thus all gathering of 
geolocation data should be protected speech. 
Third, and most significantly, the act of recording differs from opening 
one’s mouth to speak, or even from burning a flag, because both expressive 
moments are created at the same time they are disseminated.107 By contrast, 
books are printed before they are distributed; photographs are taken before 
they are displayed; and movies are filmed before they are screened.108 When 
you can demarcate the act of producing communication from the act of 
actually communicating, this raises the questions of whether the act of 
production is truly part of the communicative moment and how far into 
conduct First Amendment protections extend.109 As one scholar has noted, 
protecting the production of speech implicates issues from regulating tattoo 
parlors to regulating the production of pornography.110 
Protecting recording as speech thus raises a broader line-drawing problem: 
many forms of conduct can be understood as significantly entwined with 
speech. What is to distinguish recording from other kinds of conduct? 
Traveling to a foreign country, for example, could be cast as necessary for 
informed speech about that country.111 The Supreme Court has rejected First 
Amendment protection for such travel, noting that: “There are few restrictions 
on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of 
decreased data flow. . . . The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information.”112 
Characterizing the governance of audiovisual recording as equivalent to the 
governance of speech or governance of a communications medium fails to 
helpfully distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable regulatory interests. 
If aiming a regulation at audiovisual recording always constitutes improper 
targeting of speech, then there appears to be no room for acceptable 
nonspeech-related government motives. 
The final doctrinal justification for protecting a right to record is, in my 
view, the most convincing. The First Amendment protects not just core rights 
 
107 Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1033 (explaining that oral speech and in-person conduct are 
created and disseminated simultaneously). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1033-34. Seth Kreimer has noted that this distinction is sometimes meaningless 
in today’s communications environment because in practice images are often captured and 
immediately disseminated, such as with live video broadcasting. Kreimer, supra note 2, at 
376. 
110 Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1034. 
111 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“Appellant also asserts that the Secretary [of 
State’s] refusal to validate his passport for travel to Cuba denies him rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment.”). 
112 Id. at 16-17. 
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but also the penumbral and corollary rights that are necessary for core 
protections.113 The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]ithout those 
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.”114 The First 
Amendment protects not only speech, but also “the indispensable conditions of 
meaningful communication.”115 The First Amendment thus provides corollary 
protections beyond the core protection of speech, including the right to 
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read, freedom of inquiry, freedom of 
thought, and freedom of expressive association.116 The Court has extended 
penumbral or corollary First Amendment protections not just to the act of 
printing a newspaper, but to various links in the distribution chain, including 
the distribution of handbills,117 acts of door-to-door solicitation,118 the 
operation of sound amplification equipment,119 and the placement of 
newspaper racks.120  
 
113 The existence of such corollary rights is “necessary in making the express guarantees 
[of the First Amendment] fully meaningful.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 
(1965); see also Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097-98 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Constitutional rights thus implicitly protect those closely related acts 
necessary to their exercise . . . . [T]he First Amendment ‘right to speak would be largely 
ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the 
incidents of its exercise.’” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part))). 
114 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83. 
115 Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (proposing a “structural role” for the First Amendment in providing access to 
court). 
116 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the 
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). 
117 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168-
69 (2002) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation); Lovell v. 
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (stating that pamphlets and leaflets are protected 
because the liberty of the press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a 
vehicle of information and opinion”). 
118 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 753 (1988). 
119 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793 (1989) (finding that a city 
ordinance that regulated the sound equipment used at a public bandshell was valid but 
required First Amendment analysis). 
120 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 410 (1993). Several 
scholars have argued that the Press Clause supports these kinds of structural First 
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 
309, 318 (2008); McDonald, supra note 102, at 343 (proposing an expanded interpretation 
of the Press Clause that would “protect information-gathering conduct necessary for 
preserving valuable information flows to the public”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the 
Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 459, 463 (2012). 
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The First Amendment protects such corollary rights so that the government 
cannot prevent speech by targeting conduct that falls just outside, but is still 
necessary for, expression. Information gathering, and similarly information 
recording, is often necessary for speech to occur.121 As the Seventh Circuit 
observed:  
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily 
included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press 
rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. 
The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would 
be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the 
recording is wholly unprotected . . . .122 
Newsgathering, which I discuss at greater length below, is one such 
protected corollary right. And the newsgathering case law—while not perfectly 
mapping on to the right to record—gives significant hints as to how to 
recognize and draw principled lines around the burgeoning right to record. 
F. Recording as Speech? 
Is recording protectable as speech? This is, in my view, the wrong way to 
frame the question. If we ask the question, “Is recording speech?” then we are 
faced with limited options for making room for other values—and we fail to 
accurately capture the relationship between the recording right and physical 
spaces. If recording is speech like the Internet is speech or like movies are 
speech, then regulation of recording will likely be subjected to strict scrutiny, 
unless the regulation addresses one of a limited list of historical exemptions to 
speech protection.123 Privacy is not one of these historical exemptions, and 
thus—absent significant adjustment to strict scrutiny, or the creation of an 
explicit privacy exemption or balancing test—privacy laws regulating 
recording would almost always fail strict scrutiny and be held unconstitutional. 
This result does not comport with the Supreme Court’s suggested approach 
in Bartnicki, nor does it comport with the intuition that, in some cases, speech 
 
121 See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1058 (“[T]he Court has long interpreted the Speech 
Clause to extend penumbral protection to conduct closely associated with speech, notably 
distribution of speech but also some speech-preceding conduct. Furthermore, there seems no 
reason not to read the Press Clause to also provide some penumbral protections.”); see also 
Bambauer, supra note 2, at 70 (“One might assume that the creation of data tends to receive 
protection as well, since the collection of data is a necessary precursor to having and sharing 
it.”); Blitz, supra note 2, at 154-55 (“It is hard to see how such peripheral rights could fail to 
include the right to have access to the media and tools that make speech possible.”). 
122 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Bambauer, supra 
note 2, at 73 (“Indirect burdens on speech provoke First Amendment scrutiny . . . when the 
intended target of the regulation is so closely linked to speech, so indispensible to First 
Amendment rights, that it is an impediment to speech itself.”). 
123 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539-40 (2012); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
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and privacy should be balanced against each other and privacy might win. 
Strict scrutiny requires a categorical rather than a balancing approach to First 
Amendment protection and is particularly ill-suited to contextual analysis. The 
right to record is nothing if not contextual. 
But when we look to corollary rights, also referred to as structural First 
Amendment rights, the picture becomes clearer. When scholars characterize 
the right to record as a “necessary precursor to speech,” they characterize the 
right as a structural right, rather than equivalent to oral speech.124 Courts 
recognize that structural rights are more contextual and more entwined with 
other regulatory interests, such as an interest in raising revenue through general 
taxation, or in keeping a clear flow of traffic, or preserving quiet in a 
residential neighborhood. 
Treating the right to record as a structural right still leaves significant 
doctrinal puzzles in place. For example, it still does not explain how to 
disentangle government interests in protecting privacy from impermissible 
interests in preventing recording. And while some instantiations of structural 
rights appear to be disembodied from their physical locations (e.g., a tax on 
newspapers), others are analyzed in their physical contexts (e.g., the placement 
of newsracks). Characterizing the right to record as a structural right still does 
not yield a clear answer about whether or how the right should be situated in 
physical space. 
Analyzing recording requires analyzing context. That context often includes 
the nature of a physical space. Does an invitation to come into your home give 
the invitee a First Amendment right to record there and subject any privacy 
regulation governing recording in the home to strict scrutiny? What if you 
purchase a smart refrigerator, a toy, or a robot—does the company that sells 
the object now have a First Amendment right to record all activities in your 
home?125 Governing recording cannot possibly always trigger strict scrutiny or 
always fail intermediate scrutiny. The next Section explains why. 
G. Recording as Access 
The act of recording takes place in a physical environment. It is thus ill-
suited to being treated like an abstract category of media.126 Recording, in 
other words, is not a communications medium like movies, broadcasting, video 
games, or the Internet, to be evaluated in the abstract. Thus, in my view, it is 
incorrect to treat recording as a traditional abstract First Amendment “coverage 
problem,” involving the extension of speech protection to a new type of 
media.127 Answers to the more difficult questions about the right to record 
 
124 See Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1019, 1047. 
125 For discussion of this question, see Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What 
Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015). 
126 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 847 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 112. 
127 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 998 (referring to the question of “is X speech?” as 
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come from the understanding that recording takes place in a particular context, 
grounded in physical space and time. 
Courts have discussed the importance of grounding the recording right in a 
physical space, though they have not yet sorted out the implications of this 
analysis.128 Courts have cabined their approaches to the right to record to 
recognizing protection for recordings on matters of public concern, performed 
in traditionally public spaces.129 The currently limited nature of the recording 
right—limited to public locations and to matters of public concern—makes 
sense only if one understands the right as the progeny of corollary rights 
doctrine, specifically access and newsgathering doctrine. Access and 
newsgathering doctrine historically involves inquiry into both the type of 
material at issue and the nature of the space in which newsgathering occurs. 
Access case law addresses whether newsgatherers have a right to enter a 
particular space for purposes of gathering information.130 It is both more 
nuanced and less speech protective than the First Amendment’s treatment of 
communications media in the abstract.131 To establish whether an access right 
exists, courts perform a balancing test of sorts, discussed further below, which 
takes into consideration the nature of the location. Once an access right exists, 
courts apply something resembling a relaxed version of strict scrutiny; courts 
have upheld access restrictions more frequently than restrictions on pure 
speech.132 
This nuance is understandable. On the one hand, information gathering 
involves physical conduct in a physical space; entering a location and 
interacting with others once one is in that location. On the other hand, 
information gathering appears integral to the speech-creating process. This 
presents a difficult puzzle for courts.133 That puzzle becomes all the more 
 
the “so-called coverage problem”). 
128 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (not deciding on 
the time, place, and manner standard, but performing analysis under it nonetheless); Glik v. 
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that the right to record “may be subject 
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”). 
129 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. 
130 See generally McDonald, supra note 102, at 251-52. 
131 See id. at 273 (“[I]t is evident that a right to gather information lies at the periphery of 
traditional First Amendment protection for expressive activities . . . .”). 
132 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) (“[T]he presumption may 
be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be 
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered.”). 
133 See McDonald, supra note 102, at 256 (“On the one hand, information gathering 
frequently consists of non-expressive conduct that bears a more attenuated link to acts of 
expression than other forms of non-expressive conduct . . . . On the other hand, the 
government could abridge flows of important information to the public by simply restricting 
or burdening antecedent conduct that generates those flows.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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difficult because of the Supreme Court’s (in my view, correct) reluctance to 
privilege institutional media over citizen speakers.134 If one newsgatherer is 
allowed access, then all must be.135 This makes courts reluctant to open a door, 
because if it is open to one, it will be open to all.136 
Access case law largely addresses access to particular physical or 
sociophysical spaces. In 1974, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment 
right to access prison inmates for interviews.137 In 1980 and again in 1982, 
however, the Court held that the First Amendment requires a public right of 
access to criminal trials.138 Newsgatherers and the public may access particular 
government proceedings if (1) those proceedings have been historically open 
to the public, and (2) the public access ensures the functioning of a government 
process.139 These elements are referred to as the “logic and experience” 
principles of access case law, derived from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.140 
A different line of newsgathering cases—more directly related to the right to 
record—addresses whether a person has a right to use a particular technology 
once she has been granted legal access to a space.141 In 1965, the Court in 
 
134 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (citing Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (finding the Court 
has “consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional 
privilege beyond that of other speakers”). 
135 Id. at 353. 
136 But see McDonald, supra note 102, at 257 (proposing that courts use the Press Clause 
to provide special protection not for institutional media, but for those fulfilling a 
newsgathering and edifying role); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1025, 1030 (2011) (arguing “[f]or the Press Clause to mean something independent of 
the Speech Clause, it necessarily cannot apply to everyone” and that by limiting the “press 
club” the courts can bestow certain investigative immunities upon newsgatherers through 
the Press Clause). 
137 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding a federal prison policy 
prohibiting face-to-face interviews with inmates at maximum security prisons); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (holding newsgatherers “have no constitutional 
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded to the general public” and 
upholding a California prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews with inmates). 
138 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982); 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585 (1980) (plurality opinion). In 
subsequent cases, and using similar reasoning, the Supreme Court has recognized the right 
of access to cover juror voir dire proceedings and probable cause hearings. Press-Enter. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501, 508 (1984). Lower courts have applied the “experience and logic” principles to 
determine the existence of public access rights in other areas. McDonald, supra note 102, at 
303-04. 
139 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06. 
140 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
141 McDonald, supra note 102, at 276 n.80. 
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Estes v. Texas142 evaluated whether a television reporter had a First 
Amendment right not just to access but to televise a criminal trial.143 The Court 
said no. It explained that it “is a misconception of the rights of the press” to 
assert that the First Amendment protects a right to televise on top of the right 
of access to the court.144 The First Amendment requires only that the general 
public, the newspaper reporter, the radio reporter, and the television reporter 
all be “entitled to the same rights” of access.145 Each type of reporter is then 
free to report what information she obtains to the public through the media of 
her choice.146 The First Amendment does not, however, require that each type 
of reporter be entitled to bring into court the reporting technology most 
conducive to her type of reporting.147 
 Thus, even when a newsgatherer has a legal right to be somewhere, she does 
not necessarily have a right to film. In 1978, the Supreme Court in Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc.148 considered whether reporters who had legal access to a jail 
through public tours had a First Amendment right to bring in a camera and take 
photographs.149 Three Justices found no First Amendment right to record, even 
in a location where reporters already had legal access.150 They reasoned that 
newsgatherers have a First Amendment right to gather news, but “that affords 
no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others—private 
persons or governments—to supply information.”151 The government, in other 
words, could still ban cameras on its public prison tours. The fourth concurring 
Justice suggested that a television reporter might have a special interest in 
recording, but still joined the other three in rejecting the right in that case.152 
 
142 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
143 Id. at 534-35; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) 
(explaining that neither the First nor the Sixth Amendment requires broadcasting trials to the 
public); United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the exclusion of 
cameras from federal courtrooms does not violate the First Amendment). 
144 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539. 
145 Id. at 540. 
146 Id. at 541-42. 
147 See id. at 540 (“The news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing 
press.”). 
148 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (4-3 decision). 
149 Id. at 3. 
150 Id. at 9 (“The public importance of conditions in penal facilities and the media’s role 
of providing information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the 
public or the media to enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and 
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes. This Court has never intimated a First 
Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government 
control.”). 
151 Id. at 11. 
152 Id. at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (finding the District Court’s 
determination “that the media required cameras and recording equipment for effective 
presentation to the viewing public of the conditions at the jail” was “sanctioned by the 
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Since Estes and Houchins, the Supreme Court has held that not all broadcasts 
of trials are presumptively unfair,153 while also prohibiting a broadcast where 
the trial court failed to follow procedures under federal law.154  
 While both Estes and Houchins are still good law, courts in recent right-to-
record cases have largely ignored both cases. This could indicate that there are 
important distinctions between access case law and right-to-record case law, 
discussed more below. Or, it might mean that the balance of harms in those 
particular environments—a criminal trial and a prison—are different from the 
balance in a public forum. Finally, this blind spot could reflect both changing 
social norms around recording and changing levels of technological 
adoption.155 
As courts have recognized a right to record, they have drawn on the 
principles underlying First Amendment protection for access and 
newsgathering.156 Just as access case law ensures public access where it is 
necessary for effective government functions, right-to-record case law protects 
the right to record where it contributes to effective and accountable 
government behavior, such as policing. Just as access case law protects public 
access in places where historically access has been allowed, right-to-record 
case law protects recording at least in public fora. And just as protection for 
newsgathering requires a balancing of the strength of competing interests, 
right-to-record case law appears sensitive to the value of the speech created. 
The right to record is not precisely equivalent to an access or newsgathering 
right, however. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, most right-to-record cases 
are not really access cases.157 When a newsgatherer seeks access to a court 
room or a prison, the underlying question is whether she has a right to be there. 
When a recording is banned in a public forum, there is no underlying question 
 
Constitution”). 
153 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981) (“An absolute constitutional ban on 
broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is a danger that, in 
some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts . . . may impair the ability of jurors to decide the 
issue of guilt or innocence . . . .”). 
154 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 184 (2010) (per curiam). 
155 Chandler, 449 U.S. at 573-74 (“[Estes] does not stand as an absolute ban on state 
experimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of modes of mass 
communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, even now, in a state of 
continuing change.”); see also Kyu Ho Youm, Cameras in the Courtroom in the Twenty-
First Century: The U.S. Supreme Court Learning from Abroad?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1989, 
1993-2012. 
156 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)) (finding the ACLU’s challenge to an eavesdropping 
statute “draws on the principle that the First Amendment provides at least some degree of 
protection for gathering news and information”). 
157 Id. at 598 n.7 (“This is not, strictly speaking, a claim about the qualified First 
Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings. Access is assumed . . . in 
traditional public fora . . . .”). 
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of whether the public has a right to be there. A public forum is, by definition, a 
place where “time out of mind” the public has already had access.158 The logic 
of applying a variation of the access framework to a location where physical 
entry is already permitted is strained.  
Purely adopting the access framework thus makes little sense when we are 
addressing a right to record in public spaces. It should, however, influence how 
we address the right in private spaces.159 Some variation on the access 
framework is appropriate when we are contemplating a right to record in 
private locations or other locations where the public is not legally able to enter 
without permission.160 This result—that the scope of the right to record will 
differ depending on the recorder’s physical location—is consistent with both 
the current state of doctrine and with most scholars’ intuitions.161 But it is not 
explicable from a First Amendment perspective alone. To understand why the 
scope of the right might differ in different physical locations, we have to 
understand why physical location matters. 
H. Recording as Speech Entwined with Action 
Once the right to record has been acknowledged, what level of scrutiny 
should be applied to the regulation of recording?162 This question is one of the 
most difficult puzzles in determining how a right to record would interface 
with privacy laws. Courts have thus far indicated that recording is in some way 
speech entwined with action; recording is speech that exists in and impacts 
physical space and should consequently be scrutinized as such.163 
 
158 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
159 See, e.g., Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1028-29. See generally Tom A. Collins, 
The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists’ Right of Access to Places, 52 MO. 
L. REV. 751 (1987) (analyzing media access to private locations under the access 
framework). 
160 See S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 560 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2007) (analyzing whether there was an access right to enter and record in a park, and 
concluding that “[w]hile the Supreme Court has developed a framework for analyzing 
access cases dealing with the special issue of access to judicial proceedings . . . such a 
framework is missing in access cases outside of the judicial-proceeding context”). 
161 See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 2, at 149; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 398; Marceau & Chen, 
supra note 2, at 1027. 
162 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105 (indicating that the level of scrutiny depends on 
the context); Blitz, et al., supra note 2, at 111 (arguing the public forum doctrine provides 
the framework for determining what level of scrutiny to apply); Marceau & Chen, supra 
note 2, at 997 n.26 (“[T]he location or nature of the recording may have an impact on the 
relevant level of scrutiny applicable to speech restriction.”). I believe that, when in private 
locations the right is limited to matters of public concern, it is a matter of salience, not 
scrutiny. 
163 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (performing 
analysis under the time, place, and manner standard without deciding on whether that 
standard is generally applicable); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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Usually, First Amendment doctrine addresses speech entwined with action 
by applying either the test from United States v. O’Brien,164 or the “time, place, 
and manner” test. The O’Brien test requires that government regulation (1) be 
within the constitutional power of government; (2) further an important or 
substantial government interest; (3) be unrelated to the deliberate suppression 
of speech; and (4) incidentally restrict speech no more than is necessary to 
further the governmental interest.165 The O’Brien test allows courts to 
determine when a law impacting speech is not aimed at speech and is, 
therefore, constitutional. The time, place, and manner test similarly requires 
courts to ascertain whether the government is impermissibly targeting speech 
or aiming the regulation at other concerns.166 
A law governing trespass or physical safety would usually easily pass both 
tests even if it incidentally impacted somebody’s right to record. For example, 
if a state passed a law prohibiting trespass by a drone into private airspace, the 
aim of that law—to protect private property—would be unrelated to the 
suppression of speech, and the law would likely be constitutional even if it 
prevented a drone videographer from accessing particular information.167 If a 
state passed a law prohibiting photographers from standing in the middle of a 
public street, the aim of that law—to enable the flow of traffic and prevent 
accidents—would also be unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the law 
would likely be constitutional even if it prevented a photographer from taking 
a photograph from a particular perspective. 
The great difficulty with respect to privacy regulations is as follows: both 
the O’Brien test and the time, place, and manner test require a government 
interest that is unrelated to speech suppression.168 Recording comes within the 
scope of First Amendment coverage purportedly because it is in some way 
inextricably related to speech. Thus, an interest that requires banning recording 
seems to always be an interest related to the suppression of speech. In other 
words, governing recording initially appears to always target communicative 
rather than noncommunicative activity.169 
 
164 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
165 Id. 
166 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
167 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2015). 
168 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified 
if . . . the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”); see also 
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
169 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 63 (“[S]tate action will trigger the First Amendment 
any time it purposefully interferes with the creation of knowledge. . . . Privacy regulations 
are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. Instead they are deliberately designed to disrupt 
knowledge creation.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 390-91 (“Laws that prohibit the capture of 
images by definition interfere with the individual practice of preserving experience for 
future review, reflection, and expression—a practice that is entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1021 (“[S]tate action that directly 
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If we look at the other examples of how nonspeech harms have been 
separated from protected speech interests, the relative uniqueness of this 
difficulty becomes clearer. The government can regulate parades because, 
while they are expressive activity, parades have nonexpressive impacts on the 
physical environment, such as crowding streets, causing noise, or obstructing 
the usual traffic flow.170 The government can set regulations governing the 
time of a parade, the place where it occurs, and the manner in which it 
occurs.171 Similarly, the government can govern sound trucks, which clearly 
communicate a message, but may also create an unpleasant volume of noise.172 
The government cannot aim its regulation at the message being communicated, 
but it can aim its regulation at the level of noise that communication creates.173 
One of the requirements of such regulations is that there be other available 
channels of communication; the noise can be addressed, but the person must 
still be able to communicate her message.174 
How would this work in the privacy and recording context? It cannot, unless 
there is some way to separate the privacy interest in preventing recording from 
the communicative aspect of recording. Recording, unlike a parade or a sound 
truck, does not communicate a message that is readily separable from the 
regulable aspects of the act. The act and the communicative elements are 
coextensive. If recording itself creates the privacy harm, you cannot solve the 
problem by recording something in a way that is less harmful to privacy.175 
 
restricts non-consensual investigative video recordings implicates First Amendment speech 
concerns.”). But see Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1054 (asserting that it does not make sense to 
treat all information gathering as speech); Blitz, supra note 2, at 192 (“[P]rivacy interests in 
restricting information may, at times, outweigh First Amendment interests in information-
gathering.”); Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51 (“Targeted regulations of audiovisual 
recording . . . single out conduct commonly associated with expression and impose an 
apparent disproportionate burden on speech.”); McDonald, supra note 102, at 271 (arguing 
that eavesdropping laws do not target speech). 
170 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[T]he Court has 
recognized that the government . . . may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to 
hold a . . . parade . . . . [A]ny permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of 
speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant government interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for 
communication.” (citations omitted)). 
171 Id. 
172 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). 
173 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 792; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 
(2011) (“It is also true that the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at 
commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”). 
174 See, e.g., Forsyth Cty., 505 U.S. at 130. 
175 Recordings can be more or less harmful to privacy—they can be de-identified so that 
faces are obscured and voices are distorted, among other things. However, most government 
regulations of recording target recordings of identifiable individuals and do not contemplate 
de-identification as a mitigating factor. 
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Of course, the same argument could be made for sound trucks and parades. 
Some scholars have convincingly argued that a parade or protest is much less 
effective at communicating its message when it can be relegated to a different 
location.176 Sound trucks are similarly less effective at communicating if they 
have to be quieter. But the problem is even more pronounced with respect to 
the recording right. While message and noise level can ostensibly be separated, 
recording and recording at first glance cannot. 
III. PRIVACY AS ACTION 
Courts have tentatively treated the right to record as though it is speech that 
exists in a physical space.177 Even scholars who adamantly support a right to 
record have contemplated differences in its scope based on physical 
location.178 But why? Pressing a button to record something is a physical act, 
but this alone does not explain why courts should employ speech doctrine that 
addresses or at least acknowledges physical spaces. Turning a page is physical; 
clicking through a webpage is physical; pressing play on a DVD player is 
physical. Technically, all speech takes place in physical space. Yet some 
speech is treated as abstracted (e.g., the Internet), and other speech is 
inseparable from its physical embodiment (e.g., burning a flag).179 
Harm often defines the contours of First Amendment coverage and 
protection.180 Despite the Supreme Court’s purported speech absolutism—its 
outright refusal in several recent cases to balance speech against other 
harms181—much of First Amendment doctrinal development has consisted not 
 
176 See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 581 (2006) 
(“Place can be a powerful weapon of social and political control.”). 
177 “[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
178 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 90-91; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 393 (outlining three 
principles that set boundaries for prohibitions on image capture, including that where rules 
“seek to protect the privacy of intimate venues,” further analysis of the competing interests 
is required); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1027 (“[T]he protection of recording as 
speech activity, particularly on private property, is not self-evident as a doctrinal matter.”). 
179 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
180 This claim is related to the idea that First Amendment analysis consists of sniffing out 
impermissible government motives, but differs in that it looks to the category of harm 
created. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 413-14 (1996) (suggesting 
that First Amendment analysis should focus on government motives). 
181 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2540-41 (2012); United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
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of asking whether some act is protected as speech, but of implicitly balancing 
the protection of expression with harms.182 
The right to parade is, thus, a right to parade subject to time, place, and 
manner restrictions.183 The right to burn a flag is a right to burn a flag subject 
to government regulations of arson.184 The right to make inflammatory 
speeches is a right to do so as long as the speech is not so entwined with 
lawless action (or violence) that the action is both imminent and likely to 
occur.185 
Strict scrutiny itself is notoriously fatal in fact.186 But strict scrutiny’s scope 
is relatively limited: it applies to “pure” speech and to regulatory efforts that 
target particular topics or speakers.187 Once a court determines that the 
contemplated harm is not a speech harm, its analytical framework usually 
changes from strict scrutiny to something else.188 For all that the current 
Supreme Court has disavowed harm balancing, this shift from the analysis of 
pure speech to other frameworks occurs surprisingly often in First Amendment 
doctrine.189 
Admittedly, the United States defines speech-related harms more broadly 
than other countries. Harms to reputation, from hate speech, from the portrayal 
of violent or sexually demeaning acts, and from the publication of ostensibly 
private information, have all been considered too closely entwined with speech 
to merit distinct treatment or more deferential balancing.190 These kinds of 
 
182 See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1035 (“[P]roducing speech can involve a wide range of 
conduct that can cause social harm entirely independent of the communicative impact of the 
eventual speech.”). 
183 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear, 
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on 
the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”); cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) (stating that “parades 
are . . . a form of expression,” and are, therefore, subject to First Amendment analysis). 
184 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 377 (1968). 
185 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
186 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 8. But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in 
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 
796 (2006) (arguing that empirical data suggests that strict scrutiny is “survivable in fact”). 
187  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
188 See generally Bhagwat, supra note 33 (describing the shift from strict to intermediate 
scrutiny of First Amendment claims). 
189 See id. at 831. 
190 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1992); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that First Amendment principles 
require open “debate on public issues” even if that debate “may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”). 
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speech harms trigger either strict scrutiny or the carefully calibrated 
application of one of the historical exemptions to speech protection.191 But 
when the contemplated harm is entwined with government management of the 
features of physical space, the analytical framework changes. When the harm 
is situated in physical, rivalrous space, the government is given “somewhat 
wider leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content.”192 
Again, take parades as an example. First Amendment protection of parades 
leaves room for government regulations aimed at managing qualities of 
physical space so the protected speech is not too disruptive to the behavior of 
others in that space.193 We all share physical space, and one person’s loud 
sound truck is another person’s inability to read her book.194 The scope of First 
Amendment protections for speech that occur in physical space is calibrated 
against the government’s need to manage those environments so that other 
citizens can speak, think, live, and thrive in them. Likewise, First Amendment 
doctrine allows for government protection of the “captive audience,” who can 
be protected from speech when that speech inescapably interferes with her 
ability to go about her business in a particular physical environment.195 
The kind of privacy implicated by recording triggers this kind of 
government interest. The government’s interest in governing recording is, I 
contend, an interest in managing the qualities of the physical environment so 
that one citizen’s behavior is not too disruptive to the behavior of another 
person in that space so that it creates unacceptable costs. Just as First 
Amendment treatment of parades, sound trucks, and flag-burning requires an 
understanding of the government’s interest in preventing a nonspeech harm, 
First Amendment treatment of a right to record requires an understanding of 
the privacy interest. 
“Privacy” can mean very different things.196 Crucially, privacy in the 
context of publication is different from privacy in the context of recording. The 
 
191 Many of these exemptions developed as the First Amendment began to be applied to 
state laws protecting against dignitary harms. See Bhagwat, supra note 33, at 805. 
192 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). 
193 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989). 
194 See McDonald, supra note 102, at 266-67 (“Whenever one is granted a ‘right’ or 
‘freedom’ to engage in certain conduct, other members of society incur a corresponding 
obligation to tolerate that conduct. In other words . . . one person’s freedoms are another 
person’s chains. . . . [B]y acting in a more physical manner, chances increase that such 
actions will impinge upon important freedoms of others.”). 
195 See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2310-11 (1999); Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009) (“[T]he question is not whether the audience can 
avoid the message by leaving a particular location . . . but whether they should have to.”); 
Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Broken Bones: Balancing Access 
to Abortion and Anti-Abortion Protestors’ First Amendment Rights in Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 578 (1996). 
196 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 10. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Bartnicki reflects this intuition.197 “Privacy” in 
the context of publication is often an interest in preventing a dignitary, speech-
related harm—harm that results from exactly what makes publication 
powerful: the amplification of a piece of information and the emotional 
reaction of the person receiving it.198 First Amendment doctrine has been 
notoriously skeptical towards protecting against the amplification of private 
information, because such protection allows the government to interfere in 
both the editorial process and the persuasion of other people.199 
“Privacy” in the context of recording, however, is a different thing. It is 
physically situated.200 As described at greater length below, an individual uses 
known features of her physical environment to manage her social accessibility 
at a given moment in time and space.201 These environmental features include 
physical barriers, distance, and even the dispersal of social interactions over 
time. Recording changes that physical environment through technology that 
closes observable distances and permeates physical barriers, collapses 
temporally dispersed interactions, and broadens the potential audience to an 
interaction beyond the people physically present. 
Changes to a physical environment have real consequences for how an 
individual behaves—including behavior related to expression.202 Changing a 
physical environment by permitting recording does not necessarily alter an 
individual’s ideal calibration of social accessibility; it often causes that 
individual to change her behavior instead.203 Sometimes, that behavioral 
change may be socially desirable, promoting better behavior by public 
servants. This is the primary argument behind equipping police with body 
cameras or allowing citizens to record the police.204 Other times, this 
 
197 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 526, 531 (2001). 
198 Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, supra note 3, at 360. 
199 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534-35 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 471 (1975); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of 
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 337 (1991) (“On a general level, freedom of speech is 
valued precisely because speech has the capacity to persuade.”). But see L.A. Police Dep’t 
v. United Reporting Publ’g Co., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). 
200 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1113; see also ALTMAN, supra note 11, at vii. 
201 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
202 See Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1727, 1743 (observing the chilling effect of 
surveillance on speech, association, and individual liberty). 
203 Cf. ALTMAN, supra note 11, at 86-94 (discussing how intrusion into personal space 
changes behavior). 
204 See Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras, supra note 66, at 1560; Simonson, 
Copwatching, supra note 66, at 413; Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With 
Right Policies in Place, a Win for All, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all 
[https://perma.cc/MF9F-XESD] (“Although we at the ACLU generally take a dim view of 
the proliferation of surveillance cameras in American life, police on-body cameras are 
different because of their potential to serve as a check against the abuse of power by police 
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behavioral change may be socially undesirable, for example causing jurors to 
grandstand for their neighbors and friends.205 But just as the government has a 
legitimate interest in preventing sound trucks and parades from disrupting the 
behavior of other citizens in shared sociophysical spaces, it sometimes (not 
always) has a legitimate interest in governing recording to prevent undesirable 
changes to others’ behavior, and consequent costs. 
Understanding the privacy interest in this way explains the two biggest 
puzzles in the right-to-record doctrine: (1) why the right appears to differ in 
scope in different locations; and (2) how the privacy interest can be conceived 
of as distinct from an interest in suppressing speech. Both of these puzzles are 
explicable by understanding the privacy harm as situated in physical, temporal 
space. 
This Part defines the kind of privacy implicated by recording and protected 
in recording laws. It explains how an interest in protecting this kind of privacy 
is distinct from an interest in suppressing speech. It closes by identifying that 
this kind of privacy—the management of social accessibility using features of 
the physical environment—has been acknowledged as a protectable interest by 
courts, including the Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that protecting this kind of privacy is itself often protective of free 
expression. First Amendment interests, in other words, arise on both sides. 
A. Privacy as Physically Situated 
Privacy in the context of recording is the ability of an individual to 
dynamically manage her social accessibility at a particular moment, given 
known features of the physical environment.206 This kind of privacy is 
environmentally situated. For example, an individual in her living room may 
rely on the height of a fence, the distance between the street and her house, the 
walls of her home, and shades on her windows to prevent people on the street 
from seeing her. She consequently may feel freer to indulge in behaviors in the 
home that she would not necessarily want seen by the general public, from 
reading dissident literature to picking her nose.207 Those home-based behaviors 
may be socially beneficial: they may allow for the exploration of new ideas 
and the development of new facets of an individual’s identity; and they may 
 
officers.”). 
205 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1965). 
206 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1116; see also ALTMAN, supra note 11, at 11 (“My view 
is that privacy is profitably conceived of as an interplay of opposing forces—that is, 
difference balances of opening and closing the self to others.”); Gavison, supra note 12, at 
423 (arguing that our interest in privacy “is related to our concern over our accessibility to 
others,” which “enables us to identify when losses of privacy occur”). 
207 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1136 (citing as an example that a person might do a silly 
dance in her office every morning before answering emails, relying on barriers such as walls 
and fourth story building height). 
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serve as an outlet for energies that are repressed in public spaces.208 If a 
recording or information-gathering device can access that space (effectively 
removing physical walls by, say, using thermal imaging),209 then an 
individual’s calibration of her social accessibility will either be woefully 
inaccurate, or she will change her behavior. 
An interest in protecting privacy can be understood as an autonomy 
interest.210 It is an interest in enabling individuals to use their environment to 
make calculations about the personally appropriate degree of social exposure, 
based on features of their physical space, regardless of whether they are in 
public or private.211 That interest will not always trump free speech concerns, 
but sometimes it will. Sometimes, it will protect and enable some expression at 
the same time that it discourages other expression. 
The government’s interest in governing recording is twofold. The first 
interest is an interest in enabling individuals to accurately manage their social 
accessibility, given changes to the physical environment wrought by 
technological development.212 States have enacted eavesdropping laws that 
 
208 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-16 (1973) 
(proposing that humans perform the self socially, in different contexts, wearing different 
“masks” for different people); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) 
(describing privacy as allowing for withdrawal from public performance). 
209 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that use of a thermal-
imaging device to scan a home for illegal marijuana growth constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment “search”). 
210 It need not be understood only as an autonomy interest. It can also be understood as 
protective of democracy and community values, or as an understanding of the self as 
embedded in social relationships. 
211 One of the great fallacies of First Amendment analysis is that privacy interests either 
do not exist in public or minimally exist in public. This is incorrect. See Shulman v. Grp. W 
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1988) (“[T]here is no liability for the examination of a 
public record concerning the plaintiff. . . . [Or] for observing him or even taking his 
photograph while he is walking on the public highway. . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977))); Aisenson v. Am. 
Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that any invasion of 
privacy due to filming in a public street was de minimis); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (“[I]t is manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a 
public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy.”); McNamara v. Freedom 
Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no invasion of 
privacy and strong First Amendment interests “[w]hen an individual is photographed at a 
public place for a newsworthy article and that photograph is published”). But see Kaminski, 
supra note 11, at 1116-18; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 101, 111-12 (2004); Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 148. 
212 See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1135 (“First, the government may have an interest in 
preventing people from miscalculating their boundaries. Second, the government may have 
an interest in preserving a particular genre of boundary management—not out of nostalgia 
or fear of technological change, but because of the problems that might occur if one forces 
people to shift boundary management tactics.”). Michael Froomkin describes such 
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prohibit surreptitious eavesdropping—that is, recording an overheard 
conversation.213 If a person has notice of the recording, the recording is not 
illegal. This makes sense from a privacy perspective: if a person has notice of 
the recording, whether actual or constructive, she will be able to recalibrate her 
behavior accordingly, with the knowledge that it will be seen or heard by a 
wider audience. Many recording laws thus have notice requirements; they ban 
surreptitious recording but allow recording with notice.214 
Alternatively, the government may recognize that, even with notice, some 
behavioral changes caused by recording are particularly undesirable. This is 
the second government interest. People often manage social accessibility based 
on longstanding assumptions about a particular type of physical space. They 
employ, in the words of the relevant literature, “genres” of behavioral 
management.215 You may have one type of behavior that you employ on a 
crowded public street and another that you employ in an empty public park. 
Or, to delink the concept from particular physical locations, you may employ 
one type of behavior when interacting with a close friend and another when 
interacting with your boss. The government can have a legitimate, nonspeech-
related interest in preserving the settings within which a particular type of 
behavior occurs—not to prevent speech about a particular relationship or 
locale, but to prevent the costs of undesirable behavioral shifts. In fact, the 
government can have a legitimate, speech-preserving interest in preventing 
speech from being chilled by changes to the trusted environment. 
Some argue that this interest is still irrevocably linked to the distribution of 
information. The argument goes as follows: people change their behavior when 
they are being recorded or watched because, in large part, they fear 
downstream distribution to others. And, since First Amendment law clearly 
protects distribution, this interest in protecting privacy is clearly an interest in 
preventing speech. 
 
unforeseen surveillance as an externality. Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1729, 1732. 
213 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31(a) (2016) (describing “[c]riminal eavesdropping” 
as when a person “intentionally uses a[] device to eavesdrop”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) 
(West 2010) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a person “intentionally and 
without . . . consent . . . eavesdrops upon or records . . . confidential communication”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304(1)(a)-(c) (2016) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a 
person not present for a conversation “[k]nowingly overhears or records such conversation 
or discussion without [] consent . . . [or] for the purpose of committing, aiding, or abetting 
the commission of an unlawful act; or [k]nowingly . . . attempts to use or disclose . . . the 
contents of any such conversation or discussion”). 
214 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(1) (Supp. 2016) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as 
any attempt “in a clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record . . . the 
private conversation of another which shall originate in any private place”). 
215 Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, 
PROCEEDINGS SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., no. 1, Apr. 2003, at 129, 
133 (referring to “genres of disclosure”). 
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 I disagree. Privacy literature—and, it should be noted, significant parts of 
privacy law—recognizes that privacy harms can occur at the moment of 
recording or observation, even absent distribution to others.216 Arguing that a 
government interest in preventing recording is equivalent to a government 
interest in preventing distribution ignores this effect.217 Take the following 
example, drawn from a scholar who ostensibly believes that privacy harms 
occur only at distribution: one of the reasons for recording police officers is to 
get them to change their behavior at the moment they are being recorded.218 At 
the moment of recording, nothing has been distributed, and perhaps may never 
be distributed.219 Yet, police change their behavior nonetheless. This argument 
for protecting police recording even absent distribution rests on the same 
premise for distinguishing harms at recording from harms at distribution. A 
law targeting recording is aimed at changes of behavior in real time, in real 
space; a law targeting distribution is more likely to be aimed at a 
communicative moment between distributor and audience. And, just to be 
clear: while the change in police behavior can technically be characterized as a 
privacy harm, under every theory of the First Amendment, it does not 
outweigh the speech interests. Usually such a change in behavior is actually 
desirable from a speech perspective; it improves government functions and, 
thus, strengthens the argument for speech protection, while being minimally 
undesirable from a privacy perspective.  
 Even when an individual changes her behavior because she thinks that a 
recording will be distributed, this does not make the government interest in 
preventing recording equivalent to a government interest in preventing 
distribution. Trying to prevent the costs of a behavioral change when 
somebody believes a recording will be distributed is not the same thing as 
trying to target a communicative moment between speaker and subject. One 
involves no thought as to downstream audience persuasion while the other 
does. One involves a focus on actions taking place in a physical environment 
while the other involves a focus on a disembodied communications medium. 
 Thus, there is a twofold, nonspeech-related government interest in 
governing recording: (1) enabling the accurate management of social 
 
216 See SOLOVE, supra note 10, at 9; Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1743 (“Yet for many, 
the knowledge that one is being observed and recorded—or even that there is a substantial 
likelihood of being surveilled—is itself a harm that not only chills speech, but generally 
inhibits freedom and self-realization.”); Kevin S. Bankston & Amie Stepanovich, When 
Robot Eyes Are Watching 3 (2014) (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (arguing that 
automated reading of emails increases privacy concerns, regardless of whether a human ever 
reads the email). But see Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your Email?, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 676 (2012). 
217 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 404 (positing that privacy harms occur only at 
distribution). 
218 Kreimer, supra note 2, at 404. 
219 See, e.g., Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535-36 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
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accessibility, and (2) preserving particular behavior in particular spaces to 
avoid societal costs of behavioral changes. These two interests are strikingly 
similar to the government interests in governing protests, parades, and sound 
trucks.220 The first is an interest in allowing other users of a shared physical 
space to adapt their behavior by providing knowledge of recording or 
information gathering. This is the interest protected by allowing time and place 
restrictions on parades and by requiring parade permits. Requiring parade 
permits allows other individuals to have knowledge of a parade route and to 
route around the parade. This interest in preventing the disruption of others 
may not be an interest that should trump First Amendment concerns, but in 
practice, that is what the doctrine often allows. 
The second interest is recognized in both the parade and sound truck 
contexts by allowing the government to consider the impact of noise levels on 
other peoples’ lives. Even in the First Amendment context, the government has 
a recognized interest in protecting behavior in rivalrous spaces from undue 
disruption, where that disruption would cause shifts in behavior that in turn 
have significant social costs.221 
B. Situated Privacy in the Case Law 
Many cases have recognized this situated concept of privacy. This is not to 
say that this privacy interest has always triumphed over other values or that 
courts have explicitly identified it as a privacy interest. Courts have 
consistently recognized, however, that if we fail to protect certain 
sociophysical settings or certain features of those settings, behavioral shifts 
will occur. They have recognized the importance of the nature of physical 
space in relationship management, even in First Amendment case law. And 
they have explicitly recognized that First Amendment interests often arise on 
the side of privacy laws, not just against them, because privacy protections can 
enable disclosure within trusted relationships and in trusted sociophysical 
spaces. 
1. Privacy in the Home 
The first set of examples of this privacy interest occur in an environment 
that most people concede is private: the home. The Supreme Court has, in the 
First Amendment context, repeatedly recognized a valid government interest in 
protecting the ability of individuals to enjoy undisrupted tranquility in the 
home—in other words, protecting individuals from having to change their 
behavior.222 In these cases, individuals receive protection for their decisions to 
 
220 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 133 (identifying relevance of unwilling listener cases, 
though not linking them to the government interest in protecting this particular kind of 
privacy). 
221 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
222 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
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manage the tranquility of the home environment and are not required to alter 
their behavior to accommodate others’ speech interests. 
In Frisby v. Schultz,223 the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing 
that targeted a particular residence.224 The Court conceived of residential 
privacy as the ability of an “unwilling listener” to be free from speech that 
“inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy.”225 Similarly, in 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,226 the Court upheld regulations of sound volume 
at a public concert, reasoning that the concert would cause “unwelcome noise” 
disruptive of life in residential neighborhoods.227 The Court in Rowan v. 
United States Post Office Department228 upheld a law allowing homeowners to 
refuse the delivery of offensive materials by mail, again reasoning that to do 
otherwise could disrupt a homeowner’s control over the home environment.229 
In these cases, the Court recognized that privacy involves the connection 
between a physical environment and a person’s behavior. The Court did not 
just respect the home as private because it is privately owned or because it is 
not open to many people. The Court recognized that the privacy interest in the 
home involves decisions to maintain an environment that is uninterrupted and 
tranquil.230 The home is a space where a person has the ability to behave the 
way she likes, without interference in her behavior by outside actors. 
The interest in maintaining tranquility and controlling access to the home is 
an autonomy interest. In Rowan, the Supreme Court characterized the purpose 
of the mail delivery statute as enabling a person to manage his accessibility in 
the home.231 The Court characterized this law not just as protecting a particular 
space, but as protecting a home occupant’s autonomy interest in controlling 
access to that space.232  
Recording disrupts the nature of a physical space. If loud sounds, targeted 
picketing, and the delivery of mail are disruptive enough to a homeowner’s 
 
474, 484-85 (1988); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); see also 
Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 133. I disagree, here, with Justin Marceau and Alan Chen, who 
claim that the unwilling listener cases protect individuals only from undesired and 
disturbing messages being communicated and understood as messages. Marceau & Chen, 
supra note 2, at 1043. I read the cases to be about disruption and the First Amendment, more 
broadly speaking. But see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2012). 
223 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
224 Id. at 488 (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
225 Id. at 484, 486. 
226 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
227 Id. at 796. 
228 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
229 Id. at 738. 
230 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. 
231 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738. 
232 Id. at 736 (“[A] sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit 
every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.”). 
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management of the home environment to trump First Amendment interests, 
recording in the home environment may be, too.233 
2. Situated Privacy and Exposure to Different Audiences 
The home is in many ways the easy case. Protection for privacy in the home 
is paramount in case law.234 Even for those who understand privacy merely in 
contrast to publicity, the home is the place of least exposure to the outside 
world.235 Courts have recognized, however, that privacy can exist outside of 
the home and that exposure to one audience does not obviate a privacy interest 
with respect to other audiences.  
The Supreme Court has recognized what are essentially privacy interests in 
a variety of non-home settings. Recall that in Estes v. Texas, the Court 
concluded that televising a criminal trial violated the due process rights of the 
criminal defendant.236 The Court reasoned that recording the trial would cause 
participants to change their behavior because they would be conscious of the 
expanded audience.237 Those behavioral changes would be so socially 
undesirable in the context of a trial that the Court found that recording should 
not be allowed in these circumstances. Thus, the Court condoned a ban on 
recording a criminal trial, even where access case law required public access to 
 
233 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, 
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it 
is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an 
essentially intolerable manner.”); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 
1971) (“Plaintiff’s den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude 
eavesdropping . . . . [H]e does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is 
heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording . . . .”); see also Desnick v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Dietemann as 
happening in the home). 
234 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (“[P]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to 
which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is 
surely an important value.” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980))). 
235 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 101, 111-12 
(2004). 
236 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965). 
237 Id. at 544-45. A televised juror might fear community hostility, “realizing that he 
must return to neighbors who saw the trial themselves,” and thus “may well be led ‘not to 
hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused . . . .’” Id. at 545 
(quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). Judges, too, might change their 
behavior. Id. at 548. Witnesses may “be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given 
to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of 
statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the search for the truth, 
as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization.” Id. at 547. The Court even recognized 
the impact on the defendant’s attorney: introducing recording could have grave 
consequences for fair representation of the defendant, whose attorney may be tempted “to 
play to the public audience.” Id. at 549. 
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that trial.238 This effectively recognizes a privacy interest, as defined here, in a 
courtroom, a location clearly outside of the home. It also recognizes a 
continued privacy interest with respect to the public, even though information 
had already been disclosed to those participating in the trial and even to the 
press. 
The Supreme Court again recognized that exposure to one audience does not 
obviate a privacy interest with respect to another audience in Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc.239 The Court recognized that prison inmates have a privacy 
interest in not being recorded and broadcast by a television station.240 The 
Court recognized this interest despite the fact that prison is largely a nonprivate 
environment with respect to the government.241  
The Court has similarly addressed “media ride-alongs” with police and 
found a Fourth Amendment violation where police brought news media into a 
person’s home, even though the police were legally present with a valid 
warrant.242 Despite the fact that the police were legally allowed to be in the 
home to arrest an individual, the Court recognized a privacy interest with 
respect to the news media and its audience.243 These cases and others show a 
more nuanced understanding of privacy on the part of the Supreme Court: 
privacy does not only pertain to isolation in the home, but also to the dynamic 
management of exposure to different audiences, even if one audience already 
has permission to be there.244 
3. Situated Privacy and Buffer Zones 
Without necessarily characterizing the government interest as an interest in 
privacy, the Court has, in a series of cases, recognized a strong government 
interest in preserving behavior in the context of specific physical spaces, all of 
which were outside of the home. The government interest in preventing the 
disruption of behavior in rivalrous physical spaces has, on multiple occasions, 
overcome a First Amendment interest. 
In Boos v. Barry,245 the Court found that the government interest in 
preventing the disruption of behavior in an embassy justified a ban on 
 
238 Id. at 540. 
239 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
240 Id. at 5 n.2 (“It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined, 
but they do not lose all civil rights. Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain 
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and 
photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, however ‘educational’ the process 
may be for others.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974))). 
241 Id. at 8. 
242 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605 (1999). 
243 Id. at 611. 
244 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 164 (2002). 
245 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
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congregating in a public forum 500 feet outside the embassy.246 Despite the 
nature of the space—a public forum—and the highly protected nature of the 
speech at issue—on matters of public concern—the Court found in Boos that 
the congregation law was appropriately “crafted for a particular context 
and . . . it is apparent that the ‘prohibited quantum of disturbance’ is whether 
normal embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted.”247 Without 
calling this a privacy interest, the Court chose to preserve a particular category 
of behavior in rivalrous physical space against real First Amendment interests 
in protesting against embassy activity. 
In a series of cases, the Court considered the government interest in 
protecting entrance and egress at healthcare facilities (that is, abortion 
facilities) from disruption by stationed protestors and petitioners. In Hill v. 
Colorado,248 the Court upheld a Colorado law creating an eight-foot floating 
buffer zone around a person within 100 feet of every healthcare facility.249 A 
protestor or petitioner could approach a person within that buffer zone only 
with permission. The Court in Hill recognized the government’s interest in 
protecting the unwilling listener as a “privacy interest” that “varies widely in 
different settings.”250 That interest was not limited to the home, or to private 
enclosed spaces. It could exist even “in ‘the Sheep Meadow’ portion of Central 
Park.”251 The strength of this privacy interest depends, the Court noted, on both 
social and physical context.252 
The government interest in Hill was articulated not as an interest in 
protecting unwilling listeners from offensive speech, but as an interest in 
protecting them from the moment of “deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault’” in a 
rivalrous physical setting.253 The Court recognized that such an “assault” 
would likely cause a change in behavior and that the government has a 
legitimate interest in protecting individuals in that context from undue 
 
246 Id. at 331, 334. Elsewhere, I have argued that Boos impinges on the First Amendment 
right to peaceably assemble. Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash 
Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2012). I discuss below some limitations of the analysis in 
Boos, including the Court’s lack of attentiveness to the right to peaceably assemble. 
247 Boos, 485 U.S. at 332 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 
(1972)). 
248 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
249 Id. at 718. 
250 Id. at 716. 
251 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989)). 
252 Id. at 717 (“The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of 
the home . . . and its immediate surroundings, . . . but can also be protected in 
confrontational settings.” (citations omitted)). 
253 Id. at 716 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 n.6 (1975)); see 
also Corbin, supra note 195, at 945-46. 
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disruptions to their behavior.254 In Hill, the buffer-zone law was found to be 
content-neutral and survived application of the time, place, and manner test.255 
Similarly, in Burson v. Freeman,256 the Court upheld a 100-foot election-day 
buffer zone around voting locations.257 The Court found the law in Burson to 
in fact be content based and, consequently, applied strict scrutiny.258 The law 
nonetheless survived strict scrutiny because of the strength of the 
government’s interest in protecting voters from undue influence and protecting 
the integrity of the election.259 
While the Court again did not explicitly describe this interest as a privacy 
interest, it described the effect of the law in what should by now be familiar 
terms. Failure to limit the area around the voter on the day of an election could 
result in intimidation by employers and others.260 This interference, resulting in 
changed behavior by the voter, would disrupt the integrity of the vote. 
Protecting the secrecy of the vote by protecting the area around the voter was 
an acceptable interest in preventing voter behavior change.261 It effectively is 
an interest in protecting voter privacy. 
The above case law should be read with important caveats. First, the cases 
give little thought to the First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, which 
should afford heightened protection for protestors.262 Restricting the right of 
individuals to peaceably assemble has significant implications for democratic 
society under all theories of the First Amendment.263 Second, many 
commentators have looked at these cases as poor examples of First 
Amendment reasoning.264 They are, however, current doctrine, and inasmuch 
as this Article attempts to work within the existing doctrinal framework, they 
 
254 Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (“[W]e have recognized that ‘[t]he First Amendment does not 
demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the 
cacophony of political protests.’” (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 
753, 772-73 (1994))). 
255 Id. at 724. 
256 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
257 Id. at 211. 
258 Id. at 198. 
259 Id. at 199. 
260 Id. at 204 (“One commentator remarked of the New York law of 1888: ‘We have 
secured secrecy; and intimidation by employers, party bosses, police officers, saloonkeepers 
and others has come to an end.’”). 
261 Id. at 207-08 (“The only way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit access to 
the area around the voter.”). 
262 Kaminski, supra note 246, at 36. I have not previously contemplated the scenario 
where a host of peaceable videographers stand in a particular area and simultaneously 
peaceably assemble and record what’s going on around them. For purposes of this Article, 
two different kinds of rights are at issue in that fact pattern. It may be that the government 
can more readily regulate the recording than the protest, or vice versa. 
263 Id. at 37. 
264 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 176, at 583-89. 
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are legitimate sources of law. Third, even within the doctrinal framework that 
these cases establish, it is not clear that the Court correctly evaluated the 
strength of the government interest. The government interest in, say, protecting 
the genre of behavior that occurs within an embassy is not necessarily a strong 
privacy interest. Embassies are sites of public governance that might expect to 
regularly encounter protests. The abortion-provider cases are more 
complicated; although the sites might expect to regularly encounter protests, 
patients’ privacy interests are stronger than those of embassy employees. 
While these cases are subject to legitimate criticism in how they assess the 
strength of the protestors’ rights and the strength of the government’s interest, 
they set up the currently operable doctrinal framework for weighing First 
Amendment rights against disruptions to a physical environment. 
The Court in Snyder v. Phelps265 recently assessed a privacy interest outside 
of the home under a different doctrinal framework.266 What is surprising, 
however, is that the Court nodded to the same privacy interests articulated 
throughout this Article. In Snyder, the Court considered whether protestors 
from the Westboro Baptist Church could be held liable for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion for staging a protest near a 
military funeral.267 The regulation at issue was not content neutral—it turned 
on the reaction of listeners to the speech—and thus failed to pass the Court’s 
scrutiny.268 
Even in Snyder, however, the Court acknowledged a legitimate government 
interest in preventing behavioral disturbances in shared public spaces.269 The 
Court explained that church members were not disruptive of the funeral 
service; the picketing occurred 1000 feet from the church, out of sight, and 
“[t]he protest was not unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.”270 
The Court distinguished the unwilling listener cases of Rowan and Frisby, not 
because they involved the privacy of the home, but because “there is no 
indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service 
itself.”271 The strong implication is that there may be a valid and substantial 
government interest in preventing interference with or disruption of behavior at 
funerals that, unlike the regulation at issue in Snyder, might survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.272 
 
265 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
266 Id. at 451. 
267 Id. at 447. 
268 Id. at 457 (“The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing 
turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference 
with the funeral itself.”). 
269 Id. at 456. 
270 Id. at 457. 
271 Id. at 460 (emphasis added). 
272 The Court considered the possibility of buffer zones around funerals. Id. at 457 (“To 
the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort 
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The Court in Snyder, in fact, went a step further than in other cases, 
implying that behavioral disruption in shared spaces could even be taken into 
account in strict scrutiny analysis of a content-based law. In considering 
whether Westboro Baptist Church could invoke the First Amendment as a 
defense to state tort claims, the Court emphasized that the speech must be on a 
matter of public concern.273 The Court then outlined a test for determining 
whether speech is on a “matter of public concern”: courts must look to the 
whole record and examine “content, form, and context” of that speech.274 
Context includes “all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, 
where it was said, and how it was said.”275 
Thus, even in a case involving content-based regulation, the Court in Snyder 
required that courts look to how disruptive the speech is in its sociophysical 
context. The Court appeared to incorporate what this Article has defined as 
privacy into its inquiry as to whether the First Amendment can serve as a 
defense to state tort law, even under heightened scrutiny. 
4. Situated Privacy and Persistence Over Time 
Courts have been willing to recognize legitimate government interests in 
regulating even political speech in public fora when that speech extensively 
disrupts the ability of other people to enjoy a rivalrous physical space. I have 
argued that recording can, in certain contexts, create precisely such a 
disruption. 
Thus far, however, I have limited the discussion to individually distinct 
disruptive moments, in particular spaces. But places are not just physical—
they are socially constructed, and their nature is constructed along the axis of 
time.276 A person calculating her social accessibility does not just rely on a 
physical wall to maintain distance from another person. She also relies on the 
way she spaces out interactions with that individual over time. You may call a 
close friend every day or every week. You may call a less close friend, family 
member, or professional colleague twice a year. This spacing out of the 
relationship over time is part of your ongoing management of your relationship 
with that person. 
 
verdict at issue in this case. . . . [W]e have no occasion to consider how it might apply to 
facts such as those before us, or whether it or similar regulations are constitutional.”). 
273 Id. at 452. 
274 Id. at 453 (emphasis added) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)). 
275 Id. at 454 (emphases added). 
276 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY 
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 10-11 (2012); Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The 
Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 443 (2006) (arguing that place is not 
“simply given; place is, rather, constructed and given meaning as it becomes part of an 
expressive culture”). 
  
2017] PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO RECORD 215 
 
Recording made over a longer period of time—that is, persistent 
surveillance of an individual—disrupts privacy this way. Persistent and 
targeted surveillance collapses individual moments of interaction, spread out 
over time and mitigated through human forgetfulness, into one long story of an 
individual’s life. The harms caused by persistent surveillance have been much 
discussed in the Fourth Amendment literature, as courts have considered GPS 
tracking by law enforcement.277 Persistent surveillance of an individual, even 
in public, can lead to inferences about very private areas of that person’s life: 
her religion, her addictions, her sexual predilections, her health.278 In the 
Fourth Amendment context, judges and justices have recognized the need for 
law to step in as technology lowers the costs of persistent surveillance.279 
The interest in preventing persistent surveillance of an individual has been 
less well articulated in the context of surveillance by private actors. 
Nonetheless, some important points emerge. Just as persistent surveillance in 
public over a long enough period of time can require a warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment,280 persistent surveillance over a long enough period of 
time can, in the private context, convert protectable newsgathering into 
regulable action. 
For example, a court ordered a paparazzo who persistently followed and 
photographed Jackie Onassis and her family to stay away from them.281 Cases 
addressing stalking laws characterize such persistent behavior as a combination 
of speech and action, separating out the persistence and disruption as regulable 
 
277 For one opinion in this discussion, see David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A 
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013) (exploring the prospects for and 
advantages of mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment and arguing that its practical 
challenges can be overcome through effective regulations). For a contrary opinion, see Orin 
S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) 
(considering the implications of a mosaic theory and arguing that courts should reject the 
theory because implementing it is difficult in light of rapid technological change). 
278 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that GPS monitoring impinges on expectations of privacy because it “generates a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of 
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”). 
279 See id. at 956; Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011). 
280 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that twenty-eight days of 
GPS monitoring violates reasonable expectations of privacy); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (finding that 
the use of a GPS to track an individual’s movement impairs a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and is subject to Fourth Amendment protection). 
281 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (“When weighed against the de 
minimis public importance of the daily activities of the defendant, Galella’s constant 
surveillance, his obtrusive and intruding presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable.”). 
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harassment, rather than protectable speech.282 And in the captive audience 
context, a listener is more likely to be treated as a captive audience if the 
speaker persistently follows the listener.283 
Individual targeting matters, too. Courts have found that even pure speech, 
when aimed persistently at an individual rather than distributed to a mass 
audience, can become more action-like in nature and thus may permissibly be 
regulated. Persistent phone calls, which are clearly speech, can become 
regulable harassment through their persistence when targeted at a particular 
individual instead of made to the public at large.284 
Thus, persistent surveillance of a specific individual over time may be 
deemed by courts to be regulable action rather than protectable speech. Cases 
suggest that both the persistent nature of the recording over time and the 
individual targeting of it could convert a moment of protectable newsgathering 
into speech entwined with unprotected action. 
The great difficulty, of course, is line-drawing: When does following an 
individual for purposes of gathering news about them become, instead, 
regulable surveillance or harassment? Courts have identified the same line-
drawing problem in the Fourth Amendment context: Following somebody in 
public over twenty-eight days establishes a protectable privacy expectation,285 
but who knows what the line is beyond that? What if the persistence is 
disrupted—an individual follows and records somebody for fourteen days at a 
time, followed by a three-day break, followed by fourteen days of recording? 
What if that individual follows them for twenty-seven days instead of twenty-
eight? These are questions that will arise in future cases. The point is that, 
despite a longstanding reluctance by courts to restrict recording in public 
 
282 See Galella v. Onassis, 533 F. Supp. 1076, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“It does not strain 
credulity or imagination to conceive of the systematic ‘public’ surveillance of another as 
being the implementation of a plan to intrude on the privacy of another.” (citation omitted)); 
Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (“[U]nder certain 
circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.”); see also 
Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, 
and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV 731, 749 (2013) (finding that the First 
Amendment does not apply “when someone approaches someone else too closely” or 
“repeatedly follows someone even at a longer distance” because “[t]he law plausibly treats 
all these sorts of speech as intruding onto a person physically, by using the person’s real or 
personal property or coming too close to that person”). 
283 Corbin, supra note 195, at 945; Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a 
Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 194 (1972) (including in the definition 
of “captivity” circumstances in which the target is being pursued by the communicator); 
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 
114 (1991). 
284 See Volokh, supra note 282, at 740. 
285 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify with 
precision the point at which the tracking . . . became a search, for the line was surely crossed 
before the 4-week mark.”). 
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spaces,286 targeted recording over time is different, even if it takes place in 
public.287 
To reiterate the core theme of this Article: the scope of the protectable right 
changes because the nature of the harm changes. One photograph of a person 
in public may offend his dignity. Twenty-eight days of targeted tracking 
meaningfully disrupts his environment and his behavior.288 
5. Situated Privacy and Trusted Spaces for Communication 
Social bonds are features of the communications environment as much as 
walls are or as time is. We rely on other people to keep our secrets. Trust 
matters.289 We reveal more to people we trust than to people we do not.290 In 
some contexts, social trust has not been protected by law.291. There is a 
growing academic conversation about the importance of preserving trust in 
communications and the relationship of trust to privacy.292 
 
286 See, e.g., Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *6 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006). 
287 But see Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1127-28 (1999) (positing that mere chasing and following for 
the purpose of information gathering without any physical harm or threat should not be 
made the subject of liability). 
288 But see Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506-07, 512-
13, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that a woman who followed a town’s mayor, and whose 
conduct may have satisfied the actus reus elements of criminal harassment, had a First 
Amendment interest in her photographs as part of her political activism). 
289 See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA 
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 13 
(2010), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z97T-RS7T] (“Privacy protections are crucial to maintaining consumer 
trust, which is necessary to secure full use of the Internet as a political, educational, cultural, 
and social medium.”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1207 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking 
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 
27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655719 [https://perma.cc/D76G-QQNY]. 
290 Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social 
Relationships, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 102, 102-15 (1977). 
291 For example, the Fourth Amendment does not protect people from disclosures by 
“false friends.” See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). But see Cohen 
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991); Balkin, supra note 289, at 1199; Richards 
& Hartzog, supra note 289, at 23-24 (“There is also substantial legal scholarship on the role 
of the law in general in generating or discouraging trust.”). 
292 See Balkin, supra note 289, at 1187 (recommending a shift in the focus of First 
Amendment privacy protection to the relationships of trust and confidence); Richards & 
Hartzog, supra note 289, at 2 (arguing that privacy rules can be used to enable trust in 
essential information relationships). 
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Courts have recognized that privacy can be not just in conflict with but 
necessary for the First Amendment.293 Allowing individuals a legally 
protected, safe space for the development of close relationships encourages 
them to disclose more to trusted others in those safe spaces. If the boundaries 
erected around a trusted conversation cannot be relied on, then individuals will 
disclose less. 
This raises a First Amendment concern, explicitly recognized by the 
Supreme Court.294 If there are no privacy protections for certain modes of 
communication, such as phone calls, then the First Amendment itself will 
suffer, as people will say less on the phone. In other words, if technological 
and environmental barriers fail to protect the privacy of individual 
conversations, individuals will resort to behavioral changes, disclosing less. 
There is a real First Amendment interest in preventing this chilling effect.295 
The government interest in regulating the recording of conversations 
contains, within itself, a First Amendment purpose. If eavesdropping or 
wiretapping laws are challenged under the First Amendment, courts should 
recognize that such laws also enable speech, not just prevent it. As the Seventh 
Circuit explained in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, “[t]he protection of personal 
conversational privacy serves First Amendment interests because ‘fear of 
public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on 
private speech.’”296 The First Amendment interest in encouraging free 
expression often requires the protection of privacy. 
IV. PRIVACY MEETS THE RIGHT TO RECORD 
Privacy laws that govern recording have already been challenged under the 
First Amendment. The question is: How should courts address such 
challenges? This Article has thus far discussed the nature of the recording right 
and the nature of the privacy interest at stake. This Part explains how the two 
might meet. 
First, I briefly discuss why regulations made in the name of safety or 
property ownership, that nonetheless impact privacy, are inadequate to protect 
privacy. Next, I answer the two difficult doctrinal questions posed in the 
Introduction and in Part I: Why would the recording right change based on 
location? And if the right to record is protected by the First Amendment, how 
do we disaggregate the government’s interest in protecting privacy from an 
 
293 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
294 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532-33 (2001) (recognizing that the government 
has an important interest in “encouraging the uninhibited exchanged of ideas and 
information among private parties”). 
295 See id. at 533; White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting); ACLU of Ill. v. 
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that because 
private talk in public places is common, nonconsensual recording will have an inhibiting 
effect on the number and candor of conversations). 
296 ACLU of Ill., 679 F.3d at 605 (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533). 
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illegitimate interest in preventing speech? I close this Part with examples of 
laws and cases, discussing whether courts have gotten it right, and what they 
might do going forward. 
A. Why Nonprivacy Regulations Alone Are Inadequate 
We need privacy laws. By this, I mean that we need laws that prevent 
recording or information gathering in order to protect privacy. Relying solely 
on laws that obliquely regulate recording by aiming at other purposes—such as 
keeping the airways or streets safe, or governing the boundaries of private 
property—will fail to adequately capture privacy interests and can leave 
significant regulatory gaps. 
For example, drones carry video cameras and other recording devices. The 
FAA governs aircraft safety,297 and state law determines the extent of privately 
owned airspace.298 Some scholars have suggested that we might rely on the 
combination of FAA regulations and trespass law to prevent most anticipated 
drone privacy problems and access to problematic airspace.299 
It is possible, however, for a drone to fly in accordance with FAA 
regulations, outside of privately owned airspace, and still commit a privacy 
violation. I have referred to this as the “fifty-foot gap,” referencing California’s 
recent attempt to ban drone flight under 350 feet, while the FAA suggests that 
model aircraft hobbyists fly under 400 feet.300 In the fifty feet between an FAA 
 
297 Mission, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/35CW-2TEE] (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). 
298 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Flight by 
aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into 
the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially 
with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”); Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude 
Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 191-93 (1990); Troy 
A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158-59 (2015). 
299 See GREGORY MCNEAL, BROOKINGS INST., DRONES AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATORS 4 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/drones-
and-aerial-surveillance-considerations-for-legislatures/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQK-4NEV] 
(“Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial surveillance. This approach 
provides landowners with the right to exclude aircraft, persons, and other objects from a 
column of airspace extending from the surface of their land up to 350 feet above ground 
level. Such an approach may solve most public and private harms associated with drones.”); 
Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 212. 
300  See Justin Peters, California Governor Vetoes Bill to Stop Drones from Flying over 
Private Property, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Sept. 10, 2015, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/09/10/california_gov_jerry_brown_vetoes_bi
ll_to_stop_drones_from_flying_over_private.html [https://perma.cc/Y7YX-SMC2] 
(explaining the failure of the California bill that would have banned drone flight over private 
property below 350 feet); Where to Fly, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/ [https://perma.cc/5WEC-GS4E] (last visited Oct. 14, 
2016) (advising hobbyists to use drones within line of sight and under 400 feet); see also 
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violation and trespass, drones would have been able to fly legally, record 
individuals below, and evade enforcement under either legal regime. Some 
states have attempted to regulate trespass onto privately owned airspace, rather 
than regulating recording.301 Given the existence of zoom lenses, and the fact 
that much information can be captured from an angle while not flying directly 
overhead, these laws will not effectively prevent privacy violations. Oregon 
recently amended its drone trespass law for precisely this reason.302 
Finally, it is not clear that these laws will in fact avoid First Amendment 
scrutiny. The Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley303 suggested that laws 
that restrict access to public fora will undergo First Amendment scrutiny, even 
if they do not explicitly mention speech.304 While it is unclear whether airspace 
is a public forum (at least one scholar has argued that it is not),305 the Court’s 
reasoning in McCullen should serve to caution regulators that clever work-
arounds will not necessarily avoid First Amendment scrutiny of laws designed 
to prevent recording. 
B. Why the Doctrine Changes Depending on Physical Location 
One of the biggest puzzles surrounding the right to record is why its scope 
might differ in different physical locations. Numerous scholars have intuited 
that this must be the case,306 and the case law has reflected the intuition that 
location matters.307 None, however, has explained why location should affect 
the scope of the recording right. 
Currently, the scope of the right to record appears to vary depending on the 
setting. In public fora, recording is protected; in private spaces, it might not be. 
 
PublishPurdue, Drone Videos: Surveillance or Speech?, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TOPWiIwkCso. 
301 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2015). 
302 Id. 
303 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
304 Id. at 2529 (“Thus, even though the Act says nothing about speech on its face, there is 
no doubt . . . that it restricts access to traditional public fora and is therefore subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny.”). 
305 See, e.g., Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 123-24 (arguing that navigable airspace is a 
limited purpose public forum). 
306 Marc Blitz is one such scholar and proposed using forum doctrine. See id. at 110. 
Others seem to have same intuition that the test will vary across physical spaces but do not 
explain why. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 2, at 403; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 
1034 (proposing a different test for recording on private property without consent than 
recording in public or on private property with consent). 
307 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (noting that inmates 
retain a fundamental right to privacy that is not overcome by the First Amendment rights to 
film and photograph of either the public or media); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 
595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the filming of government officials engaged in their duties in public 
spaces). 
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This variation, I believe, is appropriate. First Amendment salience—what 
counts as speech, or is visible to First Amendment analysis—can be 
understood as itself internalizing balancing between speech and other 
values.308 The default balance will differ in a public versus a private space. 
Salience can reflect this changed default as much as scrutiny. 
The scope of the right to record sets a default balance between speech and 
privacy based on assumptions about particular kinds of spaces. In public, all 
recordings may be First Amendment salient (with the exception, perhaps, of 
the persistent and individually targeted surveillance discussed above). But in 
private, only some recordings might merit First Amendment scrutiny. This 
difference in salience shows First Amendment doctrine internalizing the 
expected nature of harms that may occur in different kinds of locations. 
Lest this idea that the scope of First Amendment protection varies based on 
location be shocking—after all, the Internet and books are protected 
everywhere309—let us return to earlier examples. A newsgatherer presumably, 
like all individuals, has a First Amendment right to access a public forum. But 
a newsgatherer has a much more limited First Amendment right to access 
courts310 and has no First Amendment right to access prisons.311 It is not that 
the newsgatherer has a First Amendment right in each of these three settings 
that is scrutinized differently against different government interests; it is that 
the access right itself differs in scope. Access is less salient to the First 
Amendment when it involves more private spaces. 
Forum doctrine itself can be understood as supporting this idea: First 
Amendment protection often varies depending on the nature of the physical 
place in which the speech act occurs. First Amendment analysis differs greatly 
depending on whether the regulation is of a public forum, or a limited purpose 
public forum, such as a school, or a place of public employment.312 On the 
high seas, for example, the First Amendment is not solicitous of Greenpeace 
protests; in a public forum, it clearly would be.313 
 
308 Fred Schauer has extensively described the notion of salience. Schauer, supra note 
38, at 1768 (defining constitutional salience as “the often mysterious political, social, 
cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces that influence which 
policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not”). 
309 See Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1013. 
310 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965). 
311 See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). 
312 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 n.2 (2014) (“A different analysis would 
of course be required if the government property at issue were not a traditional public forum 
but instead ‘a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the 
discussion of certain subjects.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
470 (2009))). 
313 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Greenpeace USA has no audience at sea. And although the injunction imposes a safety 
‘bubble’ around Shell’s vessels, Greenpeace USA’s reliance on Schenck and its discussion 
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In a public forum, recording of all kinds (again, perhaps excepting persistent 
surveillance) should be First Amendment salient. Thus, courts are wrong to 
limit the scope of the right to record in public fora; speech rights in public fora 
are historically broad, and subject to greater protection—“time out of mind.”314 
That is not to say that privacy regulations targeting a public forum will be 
subject to strict scrutiny. But recordings made in a public forum will likely 
always be First Amendment salient, and regulation of them will be subject to 
some form of First Amendment analysis.  
However, this is not true of nonpublic fora, or privately owned locations.315 
There, as with newsgathering, the scope of the right will be more limited or 
even nonexistent. For example, as long as Estes and Houchins are good law, 
there is no First Amendment right to record a trial or in a prison. If there is no 
First Amendment right to record in a prison, a government-run institution, that 
begs the question of whether there is ever such a right to record on private 
property.  
One can envision courts creating a modified version of access law for 
private property, asking whether a recording right exists in a particular space 
based on balancing the recording’s public benefit against how disruptive the 
recording will be to ordinary functioning within that environment.316 This is 
effectively the question posed by access law; it is also the question posed when 
evaluating whether a public employee may speak about the government his 
employer.317 A public employee may speak about what happens in his place of 
employment only if his interest in commenting on matters of public concern 
outweighs his employer’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs.”318 In other words, a public employee’s speech is salient 
to the First Amendment only when its significance outweighs an employer’s 
interest in maintaining an undisrupted work environment. Otherwise, even 
 
of bubble zones around abortion clinics is sorely misplaced. Speech is, of course, most 
protected in such quintessential public fora as the public sidewalks surrounding abortion 
clinics. . . . But the high seas are not a public forum, and the lessons of Schenck have little 
applicability there.” (citations omitted)). 
314 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (recognizing greater protections for 
“traditional public fora that ‘time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions’” (quoting 
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))). 
315 Timothy Zick has suggested that the binary demarcation of public and private fora is 
inadequately representative of the “expressive topography” of physical space. Zick, supra 
note 276, at 439. I agree. However, as courts still use this binary distinction, and as Zick’s 
own policy recommendations suggest no change to the underlying binary, I continue to use 
the binary of public and private fora in this Article. 
316 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1007. 
317 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam); Helen Norton, 
Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75, 80 (2008). 
318 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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though it is technically speech, it is not speech for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis.319 
Both access law and public employee speech law provide examples for how 
in certain nonpublic spaces, a more limited recording right may exist. It will be 
narrower in scope, and it will be determined by balancing values at the stage of 
determining whether the right exists at all. Not all recording will be First 
Amendment salient in private spaces; the burden will be on the recorder to 
argue that recording is protected as speech in that context. 
This difference—that all recording may be protected in public spaces but 
only some may be protected in nonpublic spaces—is understandable only if 
one can articulate both the nature of the speech right and the nature of the 
anticipated harm. A person in a private location historically has had more tools 
at her disposal for managing social accessibility: walls, windows, window 
curtains, distance, rooms, and social norms for behavior in private spaces. A 
person in a public location may still desire to manage her social accessibility, 
and thus may still have a privacy interest, but her tools in that setting are fewer 
and less effective. Combined with traditional First Amendment respect for 
public fora, this suggests that the speech interest in public fora is stronger, 
while the privacy harm is usually lower. 
This is not to say that the old privacy binary, where we protect privacy in 
private spaces but not in public spaces, is correct. Rather, the division of public 
fora and nonpublic spaces at the salience stage serves to set defaults, not drive 
foregone conclusions. Speech receives a stronger thumb on the scale in public 
settings, where recording “is speech” or is salient regardless of its subject 
matter. And the framework puts a heavy thumb on the privacy side when the 
setting is not a public forum and asks for balancing of privacy with the value of 
the speech at issue. 
Privacy interests, as described in this Article, are built into First Amendment 
access analysis. The right to record doctrine will, and to a large extent should, 
reflect these default salience settings, even as recording becomes more 
culturally acceptable and pervasive, because those defaults reflect the nature of 
particular sociophysical spaces. 
C. How Privacy Can Be Separated from Speech 
The second difficult doctrinal problem created by the right to record is how 
to separate the government interest in protecting privacy from an 
impermissible interest in regulating speech. When is an interest in regulating 
recording “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” under O’Brien, or 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” under the 
time, place, and manner test?320 
 
319 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
320 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
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To address this question, privacy must be understood as it has been 
articulated in this Article: as the ability to manage social accessibility within a 
physical and temporal environment. Once the nature of privacy regulation has 
been understood in this way—as closely analogous to regulations of sound 
trucks and loud rock bands—courts can justifiably assess privacy under an 
O’Brien analysis, or time, place, and manner analysis, as they appear wont to 
do.321 As the Supreme Court has explained, while “regulation of 
communications due to the ideas expressed . . . ‘strikes at the core of First 
Amendment values[,] . . . regulations of form and context may strike a 
constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate’s right to convey a 
message and the recipient’s interest in the quality of his environment.’”322 
I here address four questions raised in practice by the interface between 
privacy protections and a right to record. First, I discuss the strength of the 
government interest: How strong of an interest in privacy is strong enough to 
withstand scrutiny? Second, when is a recording law content neutral, versus 
content based? A content-based law will undergo strict scrutiny; a content-
neutral law can instead undergo an O’Brien analysis or time, place, and 
manner analysis. Third, when is a law adequately tailored? I have argued that 
the government interest in protecting privacy can, even in public, be an 
important government interest; but in a public forum, what constitutes narrow 
tailoring of a law to that interest? Can a complete ban on recording in a 
particular space ever be narrowly tailored? And fourth, how should courts 
address the often-employed notice and consent requirements in recording 
laws? Are these a form of prior restraint?323 Or can they be constitutional? 
1. The Government Interest 
The government interest in governing recording is, as discussed above and 
at length in Part III, an interest in managing the qualities of physical space so 
as not to allow one person’s behavior to disrupt the behavior of others such 
that changed behavior results in significant social costs. That interest will not 
always be strong enough to justify suppression of recording, but it is distinct 
from an interest in suppressing speech. Regulating recording governs a 
moment of interaction in physical space, not a downstream editorial decision 
 
321 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (performing 
analysis under the time, place, and manner standard, but not deciding whether it applies); 
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). 
322 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 83-84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment)). 
323 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
169 (2002) (holding that a requirement to register before public speaking is incompatible 
with the requirements of the First Amendment). 
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based on dignitary harms. It, thus, does not break with the long tradition in the 
United States of protecting the publication and distribution of information.324 
There are two basic approaches to protecting privacy from recording in this 
context. One approach entails banning recording entirely in a particular space 
or context to prevent socially harmful behavioral disruptions. The other 
involves the less drastic requirement of notice or consent, so the individual 
being recorded does not unintentionally overexpose herself to others. 
When might that government interest be strong enough to overcome speech 
interests? First Amendment case law recognizes a legitimate government 
interest in protecting particular places from meaningful disruptions, such as the 
home, sidewalks outside the home, the area outside an embassy, and public 
sidewalks outside polling places on election day.325 Lower courts have also 
recognized an interest in protecting welfare offices, churches, and funerals.326 
This is not to say that privacy will overcome a right to record in precisely those 
same places, but to show both that in those places, the Court has been 
solicitous of privacy-related arguments, and that, in general, the Court has 
found strong enough privacy interests outside the home to overcome speech 
concerns. 
First Amendment case law also recognizes a legitimate government interest 
in empowering an individual to make choices about exposing herself to 
disruptive influences. This interest has been recognized in particular settings 
and contexts, by imposing a consent requirement for certain kinds of behavior, 
such as receiving unwanted mail at home or restricting petitioners from 
approaching within eight feet of a person outside a healthcare facility.327 
These cases establish that the government interest in preventing recording in 
some contexts, and requiring notice or consent in others, can be a legitimate 
interest. The extent to which a ban on an activity can be considered adequately 
tailored is discussed further below. 
2. Content Neutrality 
Establishing a legitimate government interest is far from the end of the 
question. A content-based law, even in a public forum, will undergo strict 
 
324 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 496-97 (1975). 
325 See supra Section II.B. 
326 E.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998); Phelps-Roper v. 
Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007); see also Corbin, supra note 195, at 949-
50. 
327 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (holding that eight-foot buffer zone 
around healthcare facility was “a valid time, place, and manner regulation”); Rowan v. U.S. 
Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“[T]he mailer’s right to communicate is 
circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no 
further mailings from that mailer.”). 
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scrutiny.328 A content-neutral law, by contrast, undergoes the more permissive 
time, place, and manner test.329 Regulating recording can raise two kinds of 
questions around content neutrality. First, if the government is regulating 
recording to prevent disruptions to the behavior of the person being recorded, 
does that make the regulation content based? Second, is regulating recording of 
a particular location content based or content neutral? 
The Supreme Court has articulated a number of tests for content neutrality. 
In Hill, the Court described the content-based/content-neutral distinction as 
hinging on “whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”330 That test, however, 
may conflate content-based regulation with the even more suspect viewpoint-
based regulation. In McCullen, the Court found a law creating a fixed buffer 
zone around abortion clinics to be content neutral because its enactment could 
be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”331 The 
law would not have been content neutral “if it were concerned with undesirable 
effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or 
‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’”332 
This test for content neutrality—whether the government is trying to protect 
listeners from speech because of their reactions to that speech—presents a 
potential hurdle for regulating recording. Regulating recording clearly protects 
the subject of recording from her reaction to that recording. In fact, as 
articulated at length in this Article, that is often the government interest: to 
allow the subject of a recording to avoid having to react to it. If one analogizes 
directly from the unwilling listener cases, then a government desire to protect 
the subject of “speech” from an adverse reaction to it seems to turn the 
regulation into a content-based regulation. 
This analogy to the unwilling listener cases is incorrect. The listener of a 
recording and the subject of a recording are distinct.333 Unlike the unwilling 
listener cases, where the person being protected from confrontation in a 
physical space is also the unwilling listener to the content of that speech, the 
target audience for most recordings is not the person being protected from 
confrontation in the physical space. It is, thus, possible to disaggregate a 
government interest in preventing undesirable behavioral shifts on the part of 
 
328 Hill, 530 U.S. at 735 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[C]ontent-based discriminations are 
subject to strict scrutiny because they place the weight of government behind the 
disparagement or suppression of some messages . . . .”). 
329 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
330 Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 
331 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (quoting City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). 
332 Id. at 2531-32 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (alteration in 
original)). 
333 But see Simonson, supra note 66, at 1575-76 (claiming that filming police is in fact 
expressive to police officers in the moment the recording occurs). 
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the person being recorded at the instance of recording, from a government 
interest in the impact of the circulation of that recording on a later audience. 
The latter motive would be impermissibly content focused; the former would 
be as content neutral as regulations of sound trucks or loud bands. 
The Court in Snyder articulated this same distinction.334 In distinguishing 
content-based regulation from potentially content-neutral buffer-zone 
regulation, the Court contrasted regulation based on content and viewpoint 
with regulation targeting the disruptiveness of behavior at the moment of 
interaction in a physical environment.335 The government interest in preventing 
the disruption of the funeral service in a physical space was a content-neutral 
interest; the government interest in preventing a reaction to “the message 
conveyed” was content based, or even viewpoint based. 
Regulating recording because of its behavioral impact on the person being 
recorded at the moment of recording, therefore, does not necessarily make the 
regulation content based. What about regulating particular spaces? A number 
of recording laws protect specific physical locations.336 If these laws are 
deemed content based, they will undergo strict scrutiny.337 If they are deemed 
content neutral, they will undergo some form of intermediate scrutiny.338 
The buffer-zone cases focus on the regulation of particular named spaces. In 
Hill, the Court deemed the scrutinized law, which regulated counseling outside 
of health care facilities, to be content neutral for three reasons.339 First, the law 
did not regulate speech itself, but instead regulated “the places where some 
speech may occur.”340 Second, the law “was not adopted because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”341 And third, and importantly, the 
 
334 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011). 
335 Id. at 457. 
336 For example, California attempted to ban drone flights over schools, wildfires, 
prisons, and jails, but the governor eventually vetoed these bills. Patrick McGreevy, With 
Strong Message Against Creating New Crimes, Gov. Brown Vetoes Drone Bills, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-pc-gov-brown-vetoes-bills-
restricting-hobbyist-drones-at-fires-schools-prisons-20151003-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5QUU-NY7N]. Idaho protects farms, ranches, and dairies from drone 
surveillance. IDAHO CODE § 21-213(2)(a)(ii) (2009 & Supp. 2016). Illinois Tennessee both 
protect hunters from drone surveillance, targeting the filming of particular classes of people 
doing particular activities, rather than particular spaces. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/48-
3(b)(10) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015). This approach 
likely poses more serious content-based problems. Of course, one great difficulty is drawing 
the line between laws aimed at speech, and laws protecting a privacy interest triggered by 
the nature of a particular location. 
337 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992). 
338 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000). 
339 Id. at 719. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
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State’s interests in protecting patient access and privacy were unrelated to the 
content of the protestors’ speech.342 
The Court in Hill explicitly rejected the idea that focusing regulation on a 
specific location makes the regulation content based.343 Similarly, the Court in 
Boos found that a regulation targeting congregating outside a foreign embassy 
was content neutral.344 A state could thus protect particular locations from 
recording without always triggering strict scrutiny. In McCullen, the Court 
again took up the question of content neutrality.345 The majority conceded that 
the law, which created a fixed buffer zone of thirty-five feet outside of a 
reproductive healthcare facility, would inevitably restrict abortion-related 
speech more than other kinds of speech.346 The majority concluded, however, 
that “a facially neutral law does not become content based simply because it 
may disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”347 
On the other hand, targeting a particular speaker or particular subject matter 
will invoke strict scrutiny.348 When a law “does not simply have an effect on 
speech, but is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers,” it 
is content based rather than content neutral.349 Courts will need to disentangle, 
on the one hand, the idea that regulating a particular physical space does not 
automatically regulate particular content, from the idea that regulating a 
particular subject matter makes a law content based. This will likely involve 
looking to government motive; again, “‘content-neutral’ speech regulations” 
are “those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.”350 
Last, there is the question of how courts should address exceptions or 
carveouts. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., a recent case addressing Vermont’s 
regulation of prescription information and data mining, the Supreme Court 
found the law to be content based and not tailored to a legitimate government 
interest in part because of exceptions to the law’s coverage.351 And in the 
 
342 Id. at 719-20. 
343 Id. at 724. 
344 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988) (noting that the Congregation Clause 
withstood First Amendment scrutiny because “[i]t [did] not reach a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct”). 
345 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014). 
346 Id. 
347 Id. 
348 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 381 (1992). 
349 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567. 
350 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); see also Sorrell, 
564 U.S. at 566. 
351 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d)-(e) (2015) (creating exemptions to general 
prohibition of use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for 
various uses); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572-73 (“Under Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share 
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recent case Reed v. Town of Gilbert,352 the Court found that an Arizona town 
code that named and regulated twenty-three different kinds of signs was 
impermissibly content based.353 
The Court appears to look at the connection between a legitimate, neutral 
state interest and the State’s decision to carve out exceptions. In Carey v. 
Brown,354 the Court invalidated Illinois’s ban on nonlabor picketing because 
the distinction between labor and nonlabor picketing could not be “justified by 
reference to the State’s interest in maintaining domestic tranquility.”355 The 
Court in Carey found the regulation to be content based because of its 
carveouts for labor picketing.356 In McCullen, on the other hand, exemptions 
for particular individuals, like clinic employees, did not make the law content 
based, in large part because the exemptions were tied to the functioning of the 
abortion clinic.357 After the Court’s recent decision in Reed, this is an area that 
will likely be open to further litigation. 
3. Tailoring 
Determining whether a law is content based or content neutral is still not the 
end of the analysis. Even when the more permissive time, place, and manner 
analysis or O’Brien analysis is applied, a law still must be tailored. To be 
narrowly tailored under time, place, and manner analysis, a law must not 
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s 
legitimate interests.358 Unlike strict scrutiny, the means employed need not be 
the least restrictive or least intrusive means.359 There must, however, be ample 
alternative means of communication available.360 This calls into question 
whether a complete ban on recording could ever be constitutional. 
 
prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any reason save one: They must not 
allow the information to be used for marketing. Exceptions further allow pharmacies to sell 
prescriber-identifying information for certain purposes, including ‘health care research.’ 
And the measure permits insurers, researchers, journalists, the State itself, and others to use 
the information.” (citation omitted)). 
352 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
353 Id. at 2228 (“The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given sign thus 
depend entirely on he communicative content of the sign . . . . On its face, the Sign Code is a 
content-based regulation of speech.”). 
354 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
355 Id. at 465. 
356 See id. at 464-65. 
357 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (2014). 
358 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
359 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (“Such a regulation, unlike a content-based restriction 
of speech, ‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the 
government’s interests.” (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799)). 
360 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
  
230 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:167 
 
In McCullen, the Court found that the fixed buffer zone around abortion 
clinics was not narrowly tailored under time, place, and manner analysis.361 
While the fixed buffer zone clearly served legitimate government interests in 
ensuing public safety, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and 
sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to 
seek pregnancy-related services,362 the law took the “extreme step of closing a 
substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”363 
This holding suggests that while a recording law aimed at a particular space 
can be deemed content neutral, it could face a tailoring challenge if it bans all 
recording in that space. Recording laws targeted at protecting a particular 
genre of behavior that occurs in a particular space—say, outside a school or 
hospital—might be deemed to be too broad in scope. 
Two factors mitigate this concern, however. First, McCullen addressed First 
Amendment protections for classic forms of expression: leafletting and one-to-
one communications, “the essence of First Amendment expression.”364 While 
courts should not be biased towards protecting particular modes of 
communication over others, the Court in McCullen was clearly concerned with 
tailoring because the regulation foreclosed historically protected 
communications in a public forum. Recording is not a classic form of 
expression. 
Second, the Court has in fact allowed foreclosure of an entire mode of 
communication in a particular location: picketing, in a public forum, in front of 
a house.365 In Frisby, the Court explained that a “complete ban can be narrowly 
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an 
appropriately targeted evil.”366 “[T]he ‘evil’ of targeted residential picketing, 
‘the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home’ . . . ‘is created by the 
medium of expression itself.’”367 Hence, the Court in Frisby found a complete 
ban on picketing targeted at the home to be narrowly tailored.368 If recording as 
 
361 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537. 
362 Id. at 2537-39. 
363 Id. at 2541. The Court explained that the fixed buffer zone upheld in Burson v. 
Freeman around polling places on election day was, by contrast, appropriately tailored to 
prevent voter intimidation because voter intimidation is more difficult to detect than 
abortion protesters. Id. at 2540. 
364 Id. at 2536 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)); 
see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting 
and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart 
of the First Amendment . . . .”). 
365 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1988). 
366 Id. at 485. 
367 Id. at 487 (first quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); and then quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
810 (1984)). 
368 Id. at 488. 
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a medium is deemed to be sufficiently disruptive of a particular environment—
as in Estes or Burson—then a content-neutral law banning all recording in a 
particular space may nonetheless survive a tailoring challenge.369 
Tailoring is related to the strength of the government interest. Where the 
government interest is not well articulated or sufficiently strong, a tailoring 
challenge is more likely to be successful. Where, however, the government 
interest convincingly identifies a particular evil that cannot be mitigated except 
by a complete ban, courts may find even a complete ban to be narrowly 
tailored.370 
4. Consent of the Unwilling Subject 
Many states include a consent requirement, a notice requirement, or both in 
their eavesdropping laws.371 Those requirements enable a surveillance subject 
to adjust her behavior by putting her on notice, and thereby accurately manage 
her social accessibility. There is a significant question of whether or when such 
a requirement might be constitutional. 
A long line of First Amendment cases shows skepticism toward regulatory 
burdens on speech. The Supreme Court has rejected registration requirements 
for pamphleteering and door-to-door advocacy, citing a First Amendment right 
to anonymous speech.372 Registration requirements discourage impromptu 
speech, operating as a form of prior restraint.373 Similarly, the Court recently 
deemed unconstitutional a consent requirement for distribution of prescriber 
information, reasoning that “[l]awmakers may no more silence unwanted 
speech by burdening its utterance than by censoring its content.”374 In Sorrell, 
the Court explained in its rejection of consent requirements that the 
“distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter 
 
369 But see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (noting that the Court has 
been particularly skeptical of “laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression”). 
370 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992). 
371 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing various state eavesdropping 
laws with explicit or implicit notice or consent requirements). 
372 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
164 (2002) (holding that registration requirement for canvassing and pamphleteering was 
unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment because of the “breadth of speech 
affected . . . and the nature of the regulation”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that requiring pamphleteers to identify themselves was 
unconstitutional, because “[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent”). 
373 See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 164. 
374 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
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of degree.”375 However, the Court’s holding in Sorrell may be limited in its 
application, as it addressed only content-based regulation.376 
By contrast, in the buffer-zone cases, the Supreme Court has three times 
rejected First Amendment challenges to a consent requirement and upheld 
consent requirements as constitutional.377 The Court’s reasoning in Hill was 
twofold: First, concerns about prior restraints generally relate to “restrictions 
imposed by official censorship,” not restrictions imposed by private citizens.378 
Second, the consent requirement is merely an attempt to empower private 
citizens to do what they already do: retain “the power to decide for themselves 
what they wish to read, and within limits, what oral messages they want to 
consider.”379 
The Court characterized the consent requirement as protecting an autonomy 
interest on the part of the unwilling listener.380 It enables the listener to make 
his or her own decisions about disruptive or confrontational speech, rather than 
imposing an official view of whether such speech should be tolerated. In the 
recording context, the buffer-zone cases suggest that one-party consent 
requirements are likely to survive scrutiny. 
D. The Tests Applied: Examples 
The right to record will be different in different kinds of spaces. In a public 
forum, courts should acknowledge that the right to record exists, regardless of 
whether the subject of the recording is a matter of public concern. This departs 
from the suggestions in current case law, but it is consistent with how speech is 
usually treated in a public forum. In a public forum, the recording law will then 
undergo time, place, and manner analysis rather than strict scrutiny, unless the 
law is content based. If the law is content based it will undergo strict scrutiny. 
In a nonpublic setting, I propose that the right to record should not exist 
unless the subject of the recording is a matter of public concern that trumps the 
interests of the recorded individual in managing her environment. This is 
consistent with how courts have treated governmentally owned nonpublic 
spaces, under both access case law and case law on the speech rights of 
government employees. Courts should consider extending some protection of 
 
375 Id. at 565-66 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 
(2000)). 
376 See id. at 566 (citing Playboy, 529 U.S. at 812). 
377 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014) (noting similarity between 
consent requirement in the challenged law and the buffer-zone law held constitutional in 
Hill); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734-35 (2000) (holding that consent requirement for 
buffer-zone outside health-care facility was constitutional); cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 
191, 211 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a campaign-free zone around polling 
places). 
378 Hill, 530 U.S. at 734. 
379 Id. 
380 See id. 
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recording into privately owned spaces, but these decisions will and should be 
highly context specific.  
Below, I discuss several examples of these tests applied to existing laws. 
Importantly, I do not claim to have discovered the ideal parameters for crafting 
a privacy law that will survive First Amendment scrutiny. Regulatory 
experimentation with balancing privacy interests and speech interests is still 
desirable.381 The below examples should, however, guide courts when they 
encounter these laws. 
1. Recording in Public Locations 
The government interest in protecting privacy will be consistently lower in 
public locations. That is not to say that it will be nonexistent. I assess three 
versions of laws governing recording in public fora to show when the 
government interest might be strong enough to survive scrutiny under the time, 
place, and manner or O’Brien test—and when it might not. 
a. The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute 
The Illinois eavesdropping statute at issue in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez382 
was unusually broad in scope.383 Unlike most eavesdropping and wiretapping 
laws, the Illinois statute had no requirement that the parties to a protected 
conversation actually have an expectation of privacy.384 It required two-party 
consent to allow recording, and while a party’s consent could be inferred, 
express disapproval would defeat that inference.385 The Illinois eavesdropping 
law could be applied to open recording of conversations conducted in public, 
where the parties to the conversation had no expectation of privacy at all.386 
The Seventh Circuit, considering a pre-enforcement action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, found that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was likely 
unconstitutional as applied to audio recording of police officers conducting 
their duties in public places.387 Thus, the Court enjoined full enforcement of 
the statute. Although the Seventh Circuit did not determine the proper level of 
scrutiny, it applied intermediate scrutiny to the statute and found that it would 
likely fail because of the lack of a reasonably close fit between law’s means 
and its ends.388  
 
381 See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They 
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57-59 (2013). 
382 679 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2012). 
383 See id. at 595. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. at 587. 
386 See id. 
387 Id. at 608. 
388 Id. at 604-06. 
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I largely agree with the Seventh Circuit’s approach. Even applying the more 
nuanced understanding of privacy detailed in this Article, the Illinois 
legislature failed to adequately state a government interest in governing 
conversations held in public by public officials conducting public duties, and 
the legislature failed to tailor the statute to legitimate privacy concerns. The 
government may have a legitimate interest in protecting conversational 
privacy, but by eliminating the requirement that conversations actually be 
private, instead protecting against all non-consensual recordings, the Illinois 
legislature “severed the link between the eavesdropping statute’s means and its 
end.”389 
Moreover, the statute at the time applied even to open, non-surreptitious 
recording, further indicating the weakness of the stated government interest in 
protecting privacy.390 The Illinois legislature, in other words, was not 
protecting an interest in providing notice to the subjects of recording so they 
could adjust their behavior—an interest that the Seventh Circuit recognized 
would have been “stronger.”391 Nor was the government protecting an interest 
in preventing undesirable shifts in behavior, because it could not articulate how 
a shift in public officials’ behavior would be undesirable.392 
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit found that the eavesdropping law was 
content neutral on its face.393 Even though an interest in protecting privacy is 
grounded in the reactions of those whose privacy is violated, the court 
explained that the law did not target any particular message, speaker, or idea; a 
law does not become content based merely because law enforcement must look 
at content to determine whether the law applies.394 It was only when addressing 
the law’s exemption for media that the court considered a possible content-
based discrimination.395 This approach is consistent with the distinctions 
between content-based and content-neutral laws discussed above: a law is 
content neutral when it addresses privacy generally, but content based when it 
governs speech based on a listener’s anticipated reaction or perhaps when it 
names a particular class of speech or speakers. 
Thus, while the Illinois eavesdropping law raised significant First 
Amendment concerns and would likely fail intermediate scrutiny, a typical 
eavesdropping law—protecting private conversations from surreptitious 
recording, obviated with one-party consent—likely would not. If the 
government could point to a legitimate interest in protecting conversational 
privacy, coupled with a consent exception, or a focus on surreptitious rather 
 
389 Id. at 606. 
390 Id. at 607. 
391 Id. at 607 n.13. 
392 See id. at 586. 
393 Id. at 603 (finding that the statute “does not target any particular message, idea, or 
subject matter”). 
394 Id. 
395 Id. at 604. 
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than open recordings, a typical eavesdropping law would likely not face the 
same problems as the Illinois law. Most eavesdropping and wiretapping laws 
in the United States include one or more of these elements.396 
b. The Wisconsin Drone Law 
In 2013, Wisconsin enacted a statute to protect its citizens from privacy 
violations committed by people operating drones. The statute makes it a 
misdemeanor to use a drone “to photograph, record, or otherwise observe 
another individual in a place or location where the individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”397 The statute does not define a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” nor does it indicate that the “place or location” need 
be in seclusion or privately owned. Wisconsin courts have previously 
interpreted the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy” in Wisconsin’s 
video voyeurism statute to apply beyond locations where a person is actually in 
seclusion.398 I, thus, analyze the Wisconsin law expecting that it may be 
applied in public locations. 
In contrast with the Illinois eavesdropping law, which does not require any 
expectation of privacy, the Wisconsin drone law protects a relatively strong 
government interest, actively defined by courts.399 The Wisconsin legislature’s 
use of the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy” delegates the extent of 
the state interest to courts.400 Presumably, courts will be aware of the First 
Amendment implications and may throw out cases that implicate First 
Amendment interests on the grounds that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
This is not to say that using the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy” 
always insulates a recording law from First Amendment scrutiny. The phrase 
might be considered impermissibly vague, although a previous Wisconsin 
 
396 See Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording 
Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 283-86 (2012); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who 
Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in 
Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 389, 394-95 (2012) (identifying the Illinois and 
Massachusetts eavesdropping laws as “the strictest in the nation”). 
397 WIS. STAT. § 942.10 (2016). 
398 State v. Jahnke, 2009 WI App 4, ¶ 9, 316 Wis. 2d 324, 762 N.W.2d 696, 699. 
399 Compare WIS. STAT. § 942.10 (2016), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2012). 
400 The Wisconsin legislature has done the same in the context of its video voyeurism 
law. See WIS. STAT. § 942.09 (2016) (documenting the Wisconsin video voyeurism law). 
Wisconsin courts have interpreted “reasonable expectation of privacy” in that context to (1) 
depart from Fourth Amendment standards, and (2) include expectations of privacy 
specifically against recording—even when a person has permission to be in a particular 
location. See Jahnke, 2009 WI App 4, ¶ 9, 762 N.W.2d at 699; State v. Nelson, 2006 WI 
App 124, ¶ 21, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168, 174-75 (finding that the phrase 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” departs from the Fourth Amendment interpretation). 
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court decision suggests that it is not.401 The law might face a tailoring 
challenge: Courts might find that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
even in locations where the First Amendment should trump any interests in 
privacy. Or, perhaps, the lack of a consent-based exception shows inadequate 
tailoring. If Wisconsin is interested in enabling individuals to manage their 
social accessibility, they ought to be able to consent to recording where 
desired. And if, instead, Wisconsin is interested in preserving particular 
behavior by outright banning recording by drone, the statute could be more 
carefully tailored to protect privacy in particular locations or scenarios. 
Of course, any kind of tailoring raises the problem of potentially making the 
law content-based. The Wisconsin law is content neutral on its face: it targets a 
technology that creates a heightened government interest in protecting privacy, 
not particular speakers. This is in stark contrast with a Texas drone law, which 
contains carveouts galore, including for a “Texas licensed real estate broker in 
connection with the marketing . . . of real property,” and for “the owner or 
operator of an oil, gas, water, or other pipeline for the purpose of 
inspecting . . . pipelines.”402 Texas singles out particular speakers—not just 
drone operators, but speakers and specific content—for different treatments. 
The Texas law is likely content based under Reed and, thus, might be subjected 
to strict scrutiny.403 The Wisconsin law is not. 
c. The Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader Law 
ALPRs track an individual’s location over time by taking photographs of 
cars’ license plates, correlating the images with GPS data, and making them 
machine-readable so they can be easily analyzed by computer.404 Arkansas and 
Utah have both enacted laws prohibiting private use of this technology.405 
ALPR companies sued Utah for violating their First Amendment rights.406 In 
reaction, Utah heavily amended the law, crafting an exception that allows 
private entities to collect license plate information and sell it to third parties.407 
Arkansas was also sued for First Amendment violations after prohibiting the 
use of ALPRs.408 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed 
 
401 See Nelson, 2006 WI App, ¶ 54, 718 N.W.2d at 183. 
402 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002(13), (17) (West 2016); see also id. § 423.003. 
403 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). 
404 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Cars—DEA Uses License-Plate Readers to 
Build Database for Federal, Local Authorities, WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2015, at A1. 
405 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1801 through -1808 (2013 & Supp. 2016); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 41-6a-2001 through 2006 (LexisNexis 2016). 
406 See, e.g., Complaint at 12-14, Dig. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Herbert, (No. 2:14-
cv-00099-CW) (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2014). 
407 Automatic License Plate Reader System Amendments, ch. 276, 2014 Utah Laws  
1158-59 (limiting the prohibition on warrantless use of ALPRs to governmental entities). 
408 See Dig. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchison, 803 F.3d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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dismissal of the case on standing grounds, nonetheless assuming an injury-in-
fact “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.”409 
Beginning in 2013, the Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader Systems 
Act makes it “unlawful for an individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or the State of Arkansas, its agencies, and political subdivisions to use an 
automatic license plate reader system.”410 The Act defines an ALPR as “a 
system of one . . . or more mobile or fixed automated high-speed cameras used 
in combination with computer algorithms to convert images of license plates 
into computer-readable data.”411 By itself, this language looks problematic. 
The Act bans the use of a camera, in combination with algorithms, to convert 
visual information into computer-readable information. Thus, it should trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
The government interest, however, is clearly in protecting citizen privacy 
from persistent location tracking over time. This, as discussed at length above, 
is a legitimate government interest, distinct from an interest in targeting 
speech.412 It might even, as discussed above, convert the recording at issue 
from newsgathering into regulable action, like stalking. This interest in privacy 
is indicated within the Act. The Act defines “[c]aptured plate data” as “the 
global positioning device coordinates, date and time, photograph, license plate 
number, and any other data captured by or derived from any automatic license 
plate reader system.”413 Read in conjunction with this definition, the Act’s ban 
on ALPRs is intended as a ban on persistent location tracking over time. 
The law may face a tailoring challenge in the future, depending on what 
“other data” is captured by ALPR systems. The government interest in 
protecting the particular kind of privacy implicated by this particular 
technology is, however, strong. 
The Act is also largely content neutral, in that it targets license-plate-related 
data, not because of the effect that location information may have on a 
downstream audience, but because collection of that information by ALPRs is 
intrinsically related to location tracking. The Act contains, however, several 
exemptions: one for law enforcement use; one for parking enforcement; and 
 
409 Id. at 957-58 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979)) (finding that while plaintiffs could be assumed to have alleged injury-in-fact, they 
had not shown it to be “fairly traceable” to either official sued because the Act is to be 
enforced by private litigants). 
410 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1803(a). 
411 Id. § 12-12-1802(2). 
412 The Massachusetts legislature, which considered but did not adopt an ALPR ban, was 
far more explicit in identifying the privacy interest: “WHEREAS, such monitoring infringes 
upon ‘the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s 
public movements’ . . . .” S.B. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012)). 
413 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1802(3)(A). 
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one for controlling access to secured areas.414 The question is whether these 
exemptions make the law content based. The law enforcement exemption is 
not problematic, because the First Amendment is concerned with state 
discrimination between private actors, not distinctions between treatment of 
private actors and law enforcement.415 The question with regards to the other 
two exemptions is, therefore, whether they are consistent with or adequately 
related to the government’s legitimate interest in protecting citizen privacy.416 
Arguably, they are at least consistent with that interest: use of ALPRs to 
control access to a secure location protects rather than offends privacy, and use 
of ALPRs for parking enforcement is presumably done with the knowledge 
and consent of the parking tenants. Both also limit the use of ALPRs to one 
environment, so these exemptions pose a lesser privacy concern than persistent 
tracking over space and time. 
2. Recording in Private Locations 
The scope of the First Amendment right to record will and should be lesser 
in private settings. Courts might adapt access case law or public employee case 
law not to grant individuals a right to trespass, but to grant individuals who 
have permission to be on the property a right to record while there.417 When 
determining whether there is a right to record on nonpublic property, courts 
should balance the extent to which the issue being recorded is a matter of 
public concern against the privacy interests of the recorded individual.418 
I discuss three examples of regulations of recording in private places where 
such balancing might occur. Even in private spaces, however, when the 
government specifically targets particular speech or speakers, the regulation 
will be content based and subject to strict scrutiny. This is apparent in the 
Idaho “ag-gag” law addressed below. 
a. The California Privacy Protection Act  
The California Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (the “Paparazzi Act”) 
protects individuals in their residences from a “constructive invasion of 
privacy.”419 Originally, the Act banned trespass via technological means, 
including through the use of a “visual or auditory enhancing device.”420 Since 
2014, it has also protected against invasions of privacy by drone.421 
 
414 Id. § 12-12-1803(b)(1)-(3). 
415 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604 (7th Cir. 2012). 
416 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529-30 (2014). 
417 See generally McDonald, supra note 102. 
418 See Whole Foods Market, Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (2015). 
419 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2009). 
420 See id. 
421 See Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 858, 2014 Cal. Stat. 5620 (changing the language 
“visual or auditory device” to “any device”); DL Cade, California Updates Invasion of 
Privacy Law to Ban the Use of Camera Drones, PETAPIXEL (Oct. 14, 2014), 
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In 1999, Rodney Smolla and Erwin Chemerinsky debated the 
constitutionality of this Act.422 Chemerinsky was instrumental in guiding its 
enactment.423 Smolla argued that the Paparazzi Act was an example of content-
based regulation targeting paparazzi.424 Chemerinsky responded that the Act 
did not target particular speakers, but instead it was a content-neutral 
regulation of a particular type of behavior.425 Smolla eventually conceded this 
point and deemed it “on the cusp between a content-based and content-neutral 
law.”426 While Chemerinsky disavowed the existence of any real First 
Amendment protection for newsgathering or recording itself,427 Smolla 
characterized the Paparazzi Act as governing “acts of communication and 
expression.”428 This disagreement between the two scholars is a microcosm of 
current disagreements over the right to record. 
What both appear to have agreed on is that at the core of the Paparazzi Act 
lies a substantial government interest. For Chemerinsky, this is an interest in 
“an extension of the concept of trespass,” enabling a person to successfully 
“shut out the rest of the world.”429 And Smolla, while suggesting that courts 
might first require a person to actively engage in that act of shutting out by 
pulling down a window shade, conceded that “[i]f journalists were to use 
sophisticated technology to somehow penetrate the walls of the building and 
obtain audio recordings of everything that was done and said, this should 
clearly be deemed intrusion.”430 
In my view, Chemerinsky was right with respect to this particular law. He 
called for an “explicit balancing” approach, weighing the speech right against 




422 Compare Smolla, supra note 287, at 1106-16 (“To the extent that the intent and 
operation of these laws focus on the traditional paparazzi, they violate current First 
Amendment principles that prohibit singling out a certain class of speakers or a certain form 
of media for specially disfavorable treatment.”), with Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the 
Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1152, 
1153-58 (1999) (“Unlike Professor Smolla, I believe that this law is clearly constitutional 
because the interests in protecting privacy outweigh the First Amendment restrictions on the 
gathering of information.”). 
423 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153. 
424 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1113-14 (“The anti-paparazzi laws are manifestly content-
based laws, because they contain as a predicate element the perpetrator’s intent to sell or 
transfer communicative material.”). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153. 
425 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153. 
426 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1107 n.38. 
427 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1155-57. 
428 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1112-13. 
429 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153-54. 
430 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1131. 
431 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153, 1161. 
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a public forum, in a private residence, it is a generous test. The Act is content 
neutral; thus, the first question under my proposed approach is whether the 
recording is on a matter of public concern. Without specific facts, this is 
impossible to determine. Where there are specific facts, courts might look to 
Snyder for an understanding of what constitutes a “matter of public 
concern.”432 The government interest in protecting individuals in the home is 
particularly high. Thus, the Paparazzi Act is likely constitutional, at least with 
respect to its approach to constructive privacy invasions.433 
b. The Idaho Ag-Gag Law 
Idaho enacted Idaho Code § 18-7042 in response to undercover video 
investigations of animal abuse at factory farms.434 This “ag-gag” law prohibits, 
among other things, entering “an agricultural production facility that is not 
open to the public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . . , 
mak[ing] audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural 
production facility’s operations.”435 Federal litigation challenging this law is 
ongoing; the district court held that it violates the First Amendment.436 Under 
the balancing test that I propose for private spaces, this law would likely fail as 
unconstitutional. The content being recorded is a classic matter of public 
concern (i.e., food safety), and the government interest in protecting privacy, 
even as defined here, is small, because food production is a heavily regulated 
industry subject to inspection by outsiders.437 The types of behavioral shifts 
that might occur at the factory due to undercover investigations are largely 
desirable, driving compliance with consumer expectations about the treatment 
of animals. They are not the type of behavioral shifts that justify banning 
recording. 
The Idaho ag-gag law, however, should be subjected not to a balancing test 
but rather to strict scrutiny as a content-based law. It does not target a 
particular location; it targets particular speech about “the conduct of an 
agricultural production facility’s operations.”438 The legislative history also 
 
432 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011) (explaining that “[s]peech deals 
with matters of public concern” when it can be considered either a “political, social, or other 
concern to the community,” or “when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest’” (citations 
omitted)). 
433 The Act is limited to photographs taken for commercial purposes. This could raise a 
content-neutrality question. 
434 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D. Idaho 2015); 
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1015 (D. Idaho 2014). 
435 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(d) (2016). 
436 See Otter, 118 F. Supp. at 1211-12. 
437 Id. at 1201 (finding that the statute “seeks to limit and punish those who speak out on 
topics relating to the agricultural industry, striking at the heart of important First 
Amendment values”). 
438 Id. at 1206 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(d)). 
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shows that Idaho legislators specifically intended to target undercover 
investigators and feared the effect of investigators’ videos on “the court of 
public opinion,” and not an invasion of privacy.439 The law was aimed 
precisely at the effect of the videos on the downstream listener and not at the 
person managing privacy in the moment the video was taken. This makes it 
classically content based. 
c. The School Case 
My final example involves not a particular law, but unevenly applied school 
policies. A district court judge in Maine recently analyzed whether a school 
district’s refusal to let the parents of a nonverbal fourteen-year-old boy equip 
himself with audio recording equipment to “tell” them about his day violated 
the First Amendment right to record.440 
The parents grew suspicious when their son came home crying one day, and 
the school failed to explain what had caused his extensive distress.441 The 
parents later observed unexplained bruises on their son’s forearms, consistent 
with grab marks, and continued their attempt to have their son wear an audio 
recording device.442 They were told that placing a recording device on their son 
would violate state law, school rules, and the school district’s collective 
bargaining agreement.443 Other disabled students, however, were permitted to 
use audiorecording devices without measures to protect student privacy.444 
School district representatives told the parents that the reason they had been 
treated differently was because the parents “want to monitor the behavior of 
school officials and employees, while the other students use recording devices 
for school-sanctioned purposes.”445 
The district court divided the First Amendment analysis into three steps: 
first, it asked whether the First Amendment “even applies”; second, it looked 
at the possibly applicable First Amendment standards; and third, it analyzed 
the government’s justifications for the prohibition.446 The court found that the 
First Amendment clearly applied to this activity, even though the controlling 
case had taken place in a public forum while this case took place in a school.447 
The court did not identify an applicable level of scrutiny, but concluded that 
 
439 Id. at 1200. 
440 See Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 12 F. Supp. 3d 173, 203 (D. Me. 2014). 
441 Id. at 181. 
442 Id. at 183. 
443 Id. at 182. 
444 Id. at 183. 
445 Id. 
446 See id. at 198-201 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 
788, 797 (1985)). 
447 See id. at 198-99 (citing Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
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even under the least protective level of scrutiny proposed by the defendants, 
plaintiffs had made out a plausible claim for relief.448 
The district court explained that the speech here involved a matter of public 
concern, looking at “all the circumstances of the speech” under Snyder.449 
Acknowledging that while most of what would be recorded would not involve 
matters of public concern, the court concluded that any information confirming 
the parents’ suspicions of abuse would be “serious enough to implicate 
community concerns.”450 Even though the audience of the recordings would 
likely be limited to the parents, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs 
would speak for the son in the broader community, making the recordings 
essential for conversations about matters of public concern.451 
Then the court asked whether the regulation was “viewpoint neutral and 
reasonable,” which is the test applied to regulations of speech in nonpublic 
forums and the test suggested by the defendants.452 The court did not address 
the reasonableness of the regulation, concluding instead that the plaintiffs had 
plausibly alleged viewpoint discrimination.453 Their request to audio-record 
their son’s day was denied because the school did not want its officials to be 
monitored, while other students were allowed to record.454 
Using the framework proposed here (and assuming that schools would be 
treated like other non-public fora, although there is a distinct standard for 
school speech), the district court should have, at the initial stage, weighed the 
speech interest in the recording against the alleged government interest in 
protecting privacy. The court was correct that the desired recordings would 
have implicated a matter of public concern, namely student safety. The court 
was also correct that the government interest in protecting student privacy was 
noticeably weak, because the school allowed other students to audio record at 
school, with no attempts to protect student privacy. The case was, thus, 
contextually rightly decided. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to record presents significant challenges to First Amendment 
doctrine. It is, however, just one example of the speech-related questions that 
arise as the digital world increasingly entwines with the physical world. 
Analysis of speech rights will, by necessity, become more and more 
contextual. This will be a challenge for courts, which currently face a blunt 
 
448 See id. at 200-01. 
449 Id. at 200 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)). 
450 Id. at 201. 
451 Id. 
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version of the First Amendment, and for scholars, who are tempted to address 
each new question as a simplified problem of First Amendment coverage.  
Recording technologies are not new communications media; they are 
expressive activity occurring in physical space. This discussion of the right to 
record shows that if we carefully identify the nature of the harms a speech right 
causes, First Amendment doctrine need not be completely disrupted. There is 
more room within the doctrine than recent Supreme Court pronouncements 
might indicate. First Amendment case law is replete with more nuanced 
understandings of privacy than commonly understood. The understanding of 
privacy harms unpacked in this Article, involving the disruption of 
sociophysical spaces in which individuals manage their social accessibility, is 
applicable to other legal contexts. From policy discussions of police-worn 
body cameras, to Fourth Amendment discussions concerning public 
surveillance systems, to discussions of whether to allow cameras at the 
Supreme Court, existing First Amendment doctrine in fact—and to many, 
surprisingly—helps explain the strength of the relevant privacy interests. 
 
